On the incidence of commissions in auction markets

We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. Commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers, and standard economics suggests that both sellers and buyers are made worse off by the tax. However, we show that when the buyers' participation constraint binds and when sellers set optimal reservation prices, the level of commissions correlates to participation and reservation prices in such a way that participating buyers strictly gain from higher commissions.     

Cross-selling,switching costs and imperfect competition in British banks

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.     

领先财富管理的运营思路——BCG中国财富管理市场研究报告摘要

波士顿咨询公司(BCG)发布的有关中国财富管理市场的最新报告探讨了在中国建立领先的财富管理业务的关键因素.BCG授权本刊撷取其精要,希望能给予致力于提升中国财富管理水平的机构和理财从业人员有益的启示.