Attitudes of Business and Non-business Students Toward Corporate Actions

This study examined differences in the attitudes of business and non-business students toward economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary corporate actions. The results from a sample of two hundred and forty-two (242) university students indicated differences across three background variables (college major, gender, and race).     

From ‘embrace and change’ to ‘engage and change’: trade union renewal and new management strategies in the UK automotive industry?

This article focuses on the relationship between the introduction of new management techniques (NMTs), trade union responses and employee attitudes in the automotive industry in the UK. In contrast to a prevailing pessimistic prognosis for the survival of traditional industrial relations in the 'new management' environment, unions remain as an independent and dissenting force. Paradoxically, one of the significant features driving union recovery has been the opportunities presented by the very nature of NMTs themselves which, among other things, have opened the possibility for increased local autonomy.     

Stock Market Reaction to Food Recalls

The costs of food recalls are examined from the perspective of capital markets. A partial event analysis technique is used in this quantitative investigation of firm-specific repercussions of incidents of microbiological contamination of food. These recalls vary by product, company size and scope, and severity. Returns to shareholders fell in some cases, but stock market reaction was not discernible in other incidents. Effects on volatility of returns also are mixed. These findings point out the potentially distinct crisis management tools that would be used for reputation in the stock market versus measures to communicate with the general public.     

Institutional stock trading on loan market information

One of the most important developments in the corporate loan market over the past decade has been the growing participation of institutional investors. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: Do institutional investors use private information acquired in the loan market to trade in public securities? This paper examines the stock trading of institutional investors whose portfolios also hold loans. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of loan amendments, we identify institutional investors with access to private information disclosed during loan amendments. We then look at abnormal returns on subsequent stock trades. We find that institutional participants in loan renegotiations subsequently trade in the stock of the same company and outperform trades by other managers and trades in other stocks by approximately 5.4% in annualized terms.     

Dominant institutional owners and firm value

This research analyzes the impact of control by dominant institutional owners (banking institutions and investment funds) on firm value. The analysis considers the level of voting rights in the hands of the dominant institutional owner and other large shareholders. The results reveal a different effect on value depending on whether the dominant institutional investor is a banking institution or an investment fund. Moreover, the results show that the presence of other large shareholders affects firm value when a dominant institutional owner controls the firm.     

The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.