Discussion of “Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy”

Cai et al. (Rev Account Stud, forthcoming, 2014) find that firms with interlocked directors are more likely to stop quarterly forecasts and that the past stopping experience of interlocked directors affects the forecast-cessation process. Their findings are consistent with the notion that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information sharing, which may result in the change of corporate disclosure policies. My discussion focuses on potential issues with the findings and implications for future study.     

匹克与阿迪达斯国际化经营战略比较研究

国际企业作为实现国际化投资、经营和管理的组织载体和国际市场行为主体,活跃在世界经济的舞台上。本文以匹克与阿迪达斯公司国际化经营战略为研究内容,从战略管理视角,结合匹克与阿迪达斯的国际经营环境之间的差异,系统论述了匹克与阿迪达斯在品牌国际化、海外市场进入模式和全球经营方面的差异,指出匹克这样的中国企业在国际化进程中既要学习阿迪达斯这样的国际著名体育企业的国际化经营战略,还要结合自身企业状况,制定合理的国际化经营战略。     

中小企业信用评级指标体系及模型研究

科学合理的信用评级有助于中小企业的发展,有助于金融机构和信用评级机构准确判断其信用状况。分析现行中小企业信用评级指标体系存在的问题,在充分考虑中小企业风险及创新能力等因素上,构建了中小企业信用评级指标体系,运用定量分析和定性分析相结合的方法建立中小企业信用评级模型,并对中小企业信用评级体系的建设提出建议。     

Profits and losses from changes in fair value,executive cash compensation and managerial power: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value (CFV) and levels of executive compensation. In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value (PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value (LCFV). Furthermore, we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.     

Why firms issue callable bonds: Hedging investment uncertainty

This paper analyzes a firm's dynamic decisions: i) whether to issue a callable or non-callable bond; ii) when to call the callable bond; and iii) whether to refund it when it is called. We argue that a firm uses a callable bond to reduce the risk-shifting problem in case its investment opportunities become poor. Our empirical findings support this argument. We find that a firm facing poorer future investment opportunities is more likely to issue a callable bond than a firm facing better investment opportunities. In addition, a firm with a higher leverage ratio and higher investment risk is more likely to issue a callable bond. Finally, after a callable bond is issued, a firm with a poor performance and a low investment activity tends to call back a bond without refunding; a firm with the best performance and highest investment activity tends to call back a bond and refund its call; and a firm with mediocre performance and investment activity tends to not call its bonds.     

Asymmetric cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings

Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009) offer contrasting conclusions regarding the corporate cash flow sensitivity of cash. We use an augmented empirical model to affirm the conclusion in Riddick and Whited that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is generally negative. In addition, we contend that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric to cash flow. The asymmetry may be due to several reasons, including binding project contracts, bad news withholding, and agency costs. Using a sample of manufacturing firms from 1972 to 2006, we document that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is negative when a firm faces a positive cash flow environment, supporting Riddick and Whited (2009), but the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive when a firm faces negative cash flows. We further divide firms into financially constrained and unconstrained ones and find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash asymmetry continues to hold in both groups. When we use institutional holding as a control for the agency problem, we find that firms with better outside monitoring dissave to capture good investment opportunities. All the results support our hypotheses that firms have different levels of responses to their cash holdings when facing positive and negative cash flows.     

观点:减税更能刺激中国经济增长

目前 ,我国宏观经济终于出现了一些可喜的转折。但这种转折大部分靠的是政府的财政投资杠杆启动与牵引的。从宏观调控的角度而言 ,我国对税收杠杆的使用 ,比之其它的杠杆 ,似乎太缺乏力度 !这到底是为什么呢 ?值得大家关注与深思。———本栏首席主持 :艾鋈镅中国经济增长率已经连续下降六个年头 (仅1996年与 1995年持平 ) ,从 1997年的 14 1%降到了 1999年的 7 1% ,同时出现了产品难销、失业增加和物价指数降低的萧条景象。用经济学的术语说 ,就是总需求小于总供给。总需求由三部分构成 :消费、投资和净出口 (出口减去进口 ) ,消费取决于收…     

技术创新项目组合决策支持系统

一、证券投资组合分析 由于证券组合在思想上与技术创新项目组合相同,即都为了在风险和收益作出权衡考虑,因此,许多学者采用Markowits思想进行R＆D项目选择,然而,证券组合模型用于技术创新项目组合决策存在的缺陷有: (1)只适合于证券投资组合,而不适合于一般工程项目和新产品开发项目(技术创新项目)的投资决策.     

浅谈财务分析指标在中小企业中的运用

在竞争日益激烈的市场经济中,经济活动追求实现经济利润最大化的目标。多年来,企业财务分析指标体系作为企业信息分析的重要资源,为企业决策者提供财务分析数据资料,做出科学的决策,把握正确的企业发展方向,实现经济效益最大化的目标,发挥了支撑和保障作用。因此,充实和完善适应现代经济发展需求的中小企业财务分析指标体系就显现出紧迫性和必要性。     

长期股权投资权益法核算下会计与税法的差异

由于我国实行的是税会分离模式,因此税法上在确定应纳税所得额和会计在确认利润的时候,二者之间必然有很多的差异,既有永久性的差异也有时间性的差异,长期股权投资权益法导致的差异比较难以把握,因为当会计对长期股权投资采用权益法核算的情况下从取得长期股权投资到最后的处置每一个环节都存在会计处理和税法规定不相一致的地方。