An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation

We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuringtrading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resourcetransfers and global participation, a scheme which we call ‘IdealKyoto Protocol’, yields an efficient equilibrium allocationfor a global economy. An altruistic international agency—say,the Global Environment Facility—should operate the resourcetransfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments shouldbe able to make independent policy commitments regarding howto control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipationof the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggeststhat the USA should be ‘bribed’ to reverse its decisionof not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.     

Can incentives mitigate student overconfidence at grade forecasts?

Research shows that college students exhibit bias in their forecasts of exam performance. Most students are overconfident in their forecasts, academically weaker students are the most overconfident, and top-performing students are underconfident. The literature identifies negative repercussions of these biases, including inadequate preparation for exams. A recurring attribute of this literature is the absence of meaningful incentives for students to forecast accurately. We implement an extra credit scheme to incentivize accurate forecasts. Depending on how forecast bias is measured, the scheme mitigates bias by top-performing students and marginally mitigates bias by other students. Our results have several implications. First, we illustrate an extra credit tool instructors can use to incentivize students to make more thoughtful assessments of their future exam performance. Second, we show how the association between incentives and forecast bias differs across student groups. Finally, we show that results in this literature are sensitive to how bias is measured.     

Controlling Episodic Air Pollution with a Seasonal Gas Tax: The Case of Cache Valley,Utah

Using daily data spanning 10 years, we establish a statistical relationship between episodic particulate-matter \((\hbox {PM}_{2.5})\) concentrations and vehicle trips in Cache Valley, Utah, and estimate an average gas-price elasticity for the region. We also estimate the benefits and costs associated with a seasonal gas tax set to reduce vehicle trips during the winter-inversion season and thereby lower health costs through concomitant decreases in the \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. We find a strong positive relationship between vehicle trips reduced and associated reductions in \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. Further, we estimate a mean gas price elasticity of approximately \(-\)0.3 in what we call a “high price variability environment.” Incorporating these results, cost-benefit analysis suggests that the social net benefit for Cache Valley associated with the imposition of a seasonal gas tax during the winter-inversion season is highly dependent upon the type of benefit estimation method used.     

Incremental and Average Control Costs in a Model of Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement Units

This paper answers three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution abatement: (i) does a source’s incremental control cost (as defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) necessarily exceed its average control cost, (ii) is incremental control cost a better approximation of a source’s willingness to pay for abatement credits than average control cost, and (iii) exactly how does trading in discrete and continuous abatement markets differ? We find that the answer to the first two questions are both “no”, suggesting that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency needs to refine its reliance on incremental control cost as the sole measure upon which to assess the financial feasibility of water quality trading. In answer to the third question, we show that the outcome of bilateral trading in the presence of discrete abatement is determined by comparing the gains from trade associated with the full sequence of possible “sunk cost trading” scenarios. For the most common case where trading partners’ average control cost curves “cross,” the trading outcome with discrete abatement is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.     

An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism

This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model for the discovery of natural resources and show that a tax on the unimproved value of land is distortionary. We then consider the time inconsistency and regime uncertainty problem created by even incremental Georgist policy. We discuss historical cases of land reform and the subsequent challenge to re-establish a credible commitment to property rights in land and natural resources.     

Networks,Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation

There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the free market in defense services favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.     

How Bell Labs creates star performers

How can managers increase the productivity of professionals when most of their work goes on inside their heads? Robert Kelley and Janet Caplan believe that defining the difference between star performers and average workers is the answer. Many managers assume that top performers are just smarter. But the authors' research at the Bell Laboratories Switching Systems Business Unit (SSBU) has revealed that the real difference between stars and average workers is not IQ but the ways top performers do their jobs. Their study has led to a training program based on the strategies of star performers. The SSBU training program, known as the Productivity Enhancement Group (PEG), uses an expert model to demystify productivity. The star engineers selected to develop the expert model identified and ranked nine work strategies, such as taking initiative, networking, and self-management. Middle performers were also asked what makes for top-quality work, but their definitions and ranking of the strategies differed significantly from those of the top performers. Taking initiative, for example, meant something very different to an average worker than it did to a star. And for the middle performers, the ability to give good presentations was a core strategy, while it was peripheral for the top engineers. Once PEG got underway, respected engineers ran the training sessions, which included case studies, work-related exercises, and frank discussion. The benefits of the program were striking: participants and managers reported substantial productivity increases in both star and average performers. The PEG program may not be a blueprint for other companies, but its message is clear: managers must focus on people, not on technology, to increase productivity in the knowledge economy.