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International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives – in the form of rewards and punishments – to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI. 相似文献
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We examine abnormal stock returns surrounding contemporaneous earnings and dividend announcements in order to determine whether investors evaluate the two announcements in relation to each other. We find that there is a statistically significant interaction effect. The abnormal return corresponding to any earnings or dividend announcement depends upon the value of the other announcement. This evidence suggests the existence of a corroborative relationship between the two announcements. Investors give more credence to unanticipated dividend increases or decreases when earnings are also above or below expectations, and vice versa. 相似文献
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ALEX CALLINICOS 《New Political Economy》2013,18(3):419-425
Most intellectuals would be pleased to have one major debate named after them. The Marxist economic historian Robert Brenner has managed the remarkable feat of unleashing two significant intellectual controversies. The first, in the historical journal Past & Present during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was provoked by his interpretation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in early modern Europe. More recently, however, Brenner has switched his attention from the longue durée of European history to the economic dynamics of contemporary capitalism. In a massive journal-length article published in New Left Review in 1998 he offered a comparative analysis of the three major Western economies—the USA, Japan and Germany—from 1945 onwards, tracing the development of a protracted crisis of profitability that, Brenner contended, explained the ‘long downturn’ experienced by global capitalism since the early 1970s. 相似文献
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Using mutual fund redemptions as an instrument for price changes, we identify a strong effect of market prices on takeover activity (the “trigger effect”). An interquartile decrease in valuation leads to a seven percentage point increase in acquisition likelihood, relative to a 6% unconditional takeover probability. Instrumentation addresses the fact that prices are endogenous and increase in anticipation of a takeover (the “anticipation effect”). Our results overturn prior literature that finds a weak relation between prices and takeovers without instrumentation. These findings imply that financial markets have real effects: They impose discipline on managers by triggering takeover threats. 相似文献
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ALEX ARMSTRONG 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2017,19(1):142-157
I consider the optimal provision of public services when individuals' effective consumption of the services depends on their proficiency in the language they are provided in. A social planner chooses levels of provision in both a dominant and minority language which are financed by a linear tax on labor income. Minority language speakers make a costly investment to increase their proficiency in the dominant language. In doing so they increase their wage and, possibly, gain access to higher levels of public services provided in the dominant language. The planner faces a trade‐off between compensating minority language speakers for their lower wages and encouraging their integration by rewarding higher levels of dominant language proficiency. Under majority voting, it is possible that the level of public services is increasing in the relative size of the minority language community. This result contrasts with what is typically assumed in the literature on fractionalization and public good provision—that cultural heterogeneity decreases the level of public goods. 相似文献
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