Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Framework

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.     

Dynamic Effects of Information Disclosure on Investment Efficiency

This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor welfare crucially depend on whether such disclosures convey information about the firm's future capital stock (i.e., balance sheet) or about its future operating cash flows (i.e., earnings). Specifically, investment efficiency and investor welfare unambiguously increase in the precision of disclosures that convey information about the future capital stock, since such disclosures mitigate the current owners' incentives to underinvest. In contrast, when accounting reports provide information about future cash flows, the firm can have incentives to either under‐ or overinvest depending on the precision of accounting reports and the expected growth in demand. For such disclosures, investment efficiency and investor welfare are maximized by an intermediate level of precision. The two types of accounting disclosures act as substitutes in that the precision of capital stock disclosures that maximizes investment efficiency (and investor welfare) decreases as cash flow disclosures become more informative and vice versa.     

Waking Up from the American Dream: On the Experience of Young Americans during the Housing Boom of the 2000s

We exploit regional variations in house price fluctuations in the United States during the early to mid‐2000s to study the impact of the housing boom on young Americans' choices related to home ownership, household formation, and fertility. We also introduce a novel instrument for changes in house prices based on the predetermined industrial structure of the local economy. We find that in regions that experienced large increases in house prices between 2001 and 2006, the youngest households were substantially less likely to purchase residential property, to be married, and to have a child, both in 2006 and in 2011.     

Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?

We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.     

Investigating the Valuation Effects of Announcements of Voluntary Corporate Selloffs

While there has been an abundance of empirical research on the subject of mergers and acquisitions, little research exists on a closely related topic—voluntary corporate selloffs. This study examines the effect on shareholder wealth of the announcement by management of an investment decision to voluntarily sell part of its operations to another firm. Positive abnormal returns are found to occur on the announcement date. However, it is found that such selloffs generally occur after a period of abnormally negative returns, suggesting the announcement is preceded by the release of negative information about the firm.     

COMPETITION CAN HARM CONSUMERS*

Duopolists selling differentiated products can generate less consumer surplus than a monopoly selling one of the products. In a Hotelling‐type model where a monopoly supplies more than half of potential consumers, but not all, entry by a rival leads to a duopoly price that is higher than the monopoly price. Consumers in aggregate will be made worse off by such entry when the effect of the price increase outweighs the benefit of extra variety. When consumers have continuous demand functions and firms use two‐part tariffs, duopoly can also result in lower aggregate consumer surplus than monopoly.     

Gender Bias and Credit Access

We extract an exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of U.S. immigrants on questions about the role of women in society. We then use data on around 6,000 small business firms from 17 countries and find that in high‐gender‐bias countries, female entrepreneurs are more likely to opt out of the loan application process and to resort to informal finance, even though banks do not appear to actively discriminate against them. These results are not driven by credit risk differences between female‐ and male‐owned firms or by any idiosyncrasies in the set of countries in our sample.