Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?

Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms’ insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock‐price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h‐6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock‐price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h‐6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.     

THE SEEKING OF STRATEGY WHERE IT IS NOT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF STRATEGY ABSENCE: A REPLY TO BAUERSCHMIDT

In this issue Bauerschmidt critiques a recent Strategic Management Journal paper dealing with the absence of strategy. In this paper (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995), we argued that strategy absence should be viewed as a legitimate phenomenon of interest. Bauerschmidt maintained that we failed to instill a new strategy paradigm and challenged our arguments as a rhetorical ploy. Unfortunately, Bauerschmidt misinterpreted our intended message. Although we challenged the conventional wisdom that every firm must have an articulated strategy, instilling a new paradigm was not our objective. Our main argument was that the concept of absence may help strategy researchers better understand existing paradigms.     

Trends and Cycles in GDP

The recent experience in the UK of substantial growth in GDP following the recession of the early 1980s has led to renewed interest in the measurement and explanation of business cycles. Development of economic as well as econometric theory has improved our ability both to measure the cycle more accurately and to offer a better explanation of its behaviour. In this Briefing Paper we present an analysis of these two developments.     

SOCIALLY OPTIMAL CRIMINAL COURT WAITING TIMES: A PARTIAL INVESTIGATION

Criminal courts provide a forum for conducting prosecutions with a guilty plea or a trial. Since queues are used as the basis for rationing scarce court facilities delays are inevitable, however courts are invariably criticised as being inefficient as a consequence. This focus on court delay defined as the time elapsing between the listing of the case in the court list and its final disposition is misleading. Rather, attention should be drawn to the considerably longer period between the initiation of proceedings and the conclusion of the case. In the case of defendants not granted bail, this pre-trial delay confers both costs and benefits on society and this observation can be used to ascertain socially optimal pre-trial waits.     

Changes in Interstate Banking Laws: The Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the impact on shareholder wealth of changes in interstate banking laws. The research demonstrates that changes in state statutes which allow interstate banking have a positive impact on the stock prices of regional banking organizations and a negative impact on the stock prices of money center banks. Interstate banking statutes initially exclude those states in which the money center banks are headquartered. The findings provide evidence that, by excluding money center banks from expansion across state lines, the competition from the regional banks may have an adverse competitive effect on the money center banks.