Generalized long memory and mean reversion of the real exchange rate

Definitive evidence regarding a rapid mean reversion of the real exchange rate is not present when using standard linear methodology, including unit root tests and fractional integration. To consider the robustness of these results, we use an encompassing model, the Gegenbauer AutoRegressive Moving Average (GARMA) model, which nests as special cases the existing linear methods. The GARMA model accommodates a complete notion of persistence and allows shocks to dissipate slowly in a cyclical manner. We find evidence supporting a weak version of purchasing power parity, where equilibrium errors are long memory with strongly persistent cycles. However, this new form of cyclical mean reversion is likely too slow to be economically meaningful. The inability to find a strong equilibrium attractor process, using a very general encompassing linear methodology provides support for the recent models that allow for a nonlinear attraction process and for shifting real exchange rate equilibria.     

Franchise branding: an organizational identity perspective

Despite the call for increased theoretical diversity in franchising research, the incorporation of organizational theory into this literature has been minimal. In response, we examine how aspects of organizational identity are represented in franchisee recruitment Web sites. We develop the concept of franchise branding to understand how franchisors position franchise opportunities to attract potential franchisees. We find that firms in the Franchise 500 use more language associated with market orientation, entrepreneurial orientation, and charismatic rhetoric when compared to a sample of lower-performing franchises. We also examine the impact of franchisor size and age to examine how liabilities of size and newness impact language use. We find that larger firms tend to use more rhetoric but detect no significant differences based on age. We conclude by discussing future possibilities for incorporating additional theoretical perspectives into the franchising literature.     

A Review of Catastrophic Risks for Life Insurers

Catastrophic mortality events are characterized by a sudden and concentrated increase in mortality and as such present a major risk to life insurers. Such events include pandemics, war, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and industrial, transport, and other accidents. Of these, pandemics arising from influenza are considered the most significant threat to the life insurance industry due to their capacity to cause a major increase in claims. We review the features and mortality implications of an influenza pandemic for life insurers, and describe a range of other risks that are likely to emerge as well.     

Bribery and inspection technology

The e-government movement advocates increased use of technology to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption by reducing the discretionary power of government officials. This paper studies the relationship between improvements in inspection technology within a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model, where the supervisor is an inspector who is hired by the principal to investigate the agent’s potentially illegal actions. We show that when technology increases the marginal or total productivity of the supervisor’s effort, improvements in inspection technology encourage some types of bribery. Although such technological improvements induce an equilibrium with bribery, compliance and social welfare can still rise. However, when technology and supervisory effort are sufficiently substitutable, improvements in technology may reduce compliance when bribery occurs in equilibrium even when those same technological improvements would have raised compliance in the absence of bribery. We also characterize the relationship between the principal’s socially optimal technology and the anti-corruption policy available to the principal and find that the socially optimal inspection technology may be a substitute for or a complement to the anti-corruption policy. Finally, we show that for any set of policies that optimally induces a no-bribe equilibrium, there exists another set of policies that induces an equilibrium with bribery that is pareto superior to it.