The effects of agricultural policy on supply and productivity: Evidence from differential changes in distortions

Incentives in agriculture are highly distorted. It has long been argued that these distortions were a key explanation for differences in supply and productivity across countries, but the empirical evidence is limited. We revisit this issue using data on policy distortions across 63 countries for the period 1961–2011. We estimate the effects of differential changes in agricultural distortions across countries on supply and productivity. We highlight concerns in our analysis and previous work about endogeneity that biases the estimated effect downward—countries that lose comparative advantage are likely to increase support for agriculture. We address these concerns by including country and region-time fixed effects, along with a rich set of controls. Overall, we find evidence that enhanced incentives through policy changes can increase the rate of production growth, with about half of the increase due to productivity increases. This result is strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa where anti-agricultural policies on exports were reduced and in Europe where pro-agricultural policies on imports were reduced, driven largely by external pressure. Endogeneity appears to be strongest in Asia where countries have followed the typical pattern of raising support for agriculture during industrialization due to a rising farm-urban income gap.     

A Model of Quota Prices in a Multispecies Fishery with “Choke” Species and Discarding

Environmental and Resource Economics - Using a two-stage optimisation model, we simulate the determination of market-clearing quota lease prices in a multispecies fishery. Assuming fixed...     

Pollutant Trading with Transport Time Lags

Environmental and Resource Economics - Surface level ozone pollution imposes significant crop yield damages. However, the quantification has mainly involved chamber experiments, which may not be...     

Owner-occupancy fraud and mortgage performance

We identify occupancy fraud—borrowers who misrepresent their occupancy status as owner-occupants rather than investors—in residential mortgage originations. Unlike previous work, we show that fraud was prevalent in originations not just during the housing bubble but also persists through more recent times. We also demonstrate that fraud is broad-based and appears in government-sponsored enterprise and bank portfolio loans, not just in private securitization; these fraudulent borrowers make up one third of the effective investor population. Occupancy frauds obtain credit at lower interest rates, suggesting a motivation for undertaking fraud. These fraudulent borrowers perform substantially worse than similar declared investors, defaulting at a 75% higher rate. We also provide evidence consistent with fraudulent borrowers’ defaults being more “strategic,” suggesting that this population poses a risk in the face of declining house prices.