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91.
Martin Abraham Kerstin Lorek Friedemann Richter Matthias Wrede 《International Tax and Public Finance》2017,24(2):179-197
Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple noncooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms affect the range of equilibria and act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be strongly internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly. 相似文献
92.
Otuo Serebour Agyemang Giulia Fantini Abraham Ansong 《Journal Of African Business》2013,14(2):225-253
ABSTRACTThis study seeks to deepen our understanding on how country-level governance structures influence prevalence of foreign ownership of firms in Africa. This study reinforces the new institutional economics perspective by empirically highlighting that governance structures influence the prevalence of foreign ownership of companies in an economy. Using archival data from 39 African economies, we found that there is a significant positive association between regulatory quality and foreign ownership prevalence. Also, foreign ownership is prevalent in African countries that are politically stable and embrace rule of law. However, we found that countries with high voice and accountability structures are associated with low foreign ownership prevalence. 相似文献
93.
Marco Guerci Abraham B. Shani 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2013,24(6):1130-1150
HR practices that look beyond focusing mainly on shareholders' interests to include a wider group of stakeholders are likely to result in a more effective HR system. This work examines Italian HR managers' perspectives of stakeholders and their perceived salience, based on data collected from 30 HR managers from the highest capitalization companies in the Milan Stock Exchange. The Mitchell, Agle and Wood model of stakeholder salience is applied to classify the stakeholders of the HR system into four clusters: definitive, dependent, discretionary and non-stakeholders. The results are discussed with reference to the body of knowledge on strategic HRM, putting forward specific managerial implications and proposing avenues for further research. 相似文献
94.
This paper examines the impact of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises' (SOE) corporate political capital and the administrative rank of the city where the firm is located on their ability to acquire economic resources. The study found that the stronger the political capital owned by SOEs and the higher the administrative rank of the cities in which SOEs were located, the easier it was for them to obtain more loans and subsidies. We also found that as the city administrative rank increased, the positive effect of SOEs' political capital on economic resources acquisition also increased. When SOEs were divided into commercial competitive versus specific functional enterprises, the administrative rank of the city in which the enterprise was located played a significant positive role in obtaining economic resources for commercial competitive enterprises, while the role of their political capital played a limited role. For specific functional enterprises, their own political capital played the more significant positive role. This paper expands the research scope of corporate political connections with a new perspective. 相似文献
95.
In a continuous‐time model of a complete information economy, we examine the case of a “pure” speculator who chooses to trade only on forward or futures contracts written on interest‐rate‐sensitive instruments. Assuming logarithmic utility, we assess whether his strategy exhibits the same structure as when he uses primitive assets only. It turns out that when interest rates follow stochastic processes, as in the model of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992), where the instantaneous forward rate is driven by an arbitrary number of factors, the speculative trading strategy involving forwards exhibits an extra term vis‐a‐vis the one using futures or primitive assets. This extra term, different from a Merton–Breeden dynamic hedge, is novel and can be interpreted as a hedge against an “endogenous risk,” namely the interest‐rate risk brought about by the optimal trading strategy itself. Thus, only the strategy using futures (or the cash assets themselves) involves a single speculative term, even for the Bernoulli speculator. This result illustrates another major aspect of the marking to market feature that differentiates futures and forwards, and thus has some bearing on the issue of the optimal design of financial contracts. Real financial markets being, in fact, incomplete, the additional “endogenous” risk associated with forwards cannot be hedged perfectly. Since using futures eliminates the latter, risk‐averse agents will find them attractive in relation to forward contracts, other things being equal. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 507–523, 2000 相似文献
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