Existence of a statistical equilibrium for an economy with endogenous offer sets

A statistical equilibrium consists of distributions over offer sets of agents that can be achieved in the greatest number of ways. Although it is known that a unique equilibrium exists when the offer sets are finite and exogenous, the general case has been an open question. This paper (1) generalizes the concept of statistical equilibrium to the case where offer sets are endogenous and not necessarily finite, (2) proves the existence of equilibrium, (3) discusses a computational algorithm to obtain the equilibrium, and (4) applies the theory to the labor market and analyzes the implication of the minimum wage policy.     

Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer. We prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a Rubinstein-type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self-selection property.     

Sustainability of public debt,public capital formation,and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations setting

Under the golden rule of public finance for public investment with a constant budget deficit/GDP ratio, we show that for the sustainability of government budget deficits there is a threshold of the initial public debt for a given stock of public capital, and that this threshold level of public debt is increasing in the stock of public capital. If the initial public debt is greater than the threshold, the government can no longer sustain budget deficits, while if it is smaller, the government can conduct a permanent deficit policy, which eventually leads to a positive public debt/GDP ratio.     

Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at pareto allocations

We attempt to determine the probability of a blocking coalition from a notion of being non- Walrasian which does not rely on the explicit use of norms. The key concept introduced is that of Walras degrees. Theorem 1 gives the bounds of the probability of blocking in terms of these degrees. Theorem 2 gives the asymptotic conditional probability of a blocking coalition given that coalitions are losing. The relationship between the degrees of the conventional norms on allocations is also investigated.     

Money,growth, and the stability of the steady state under myopic perfect foresight

The stability of a monetary growth model is demonstrated. It differs from the standard two- asset model in the presence of interest bearing government debt, the endogenous determination of the money supply and an investment function that is sensitive to interest rates and disposable income.     

Securitized markets,international capital flows,and global welfare

We study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on international capital flows and welfare in a two-country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk. The low-margin country (Home) endogenously supplies more safe assets and enables more risk sharing. Upon financial integration, capital flows from Foreign (high-margin country) to Home, leading to lower interest rates and a larger global supply of safe assets. Unlike in standard models with partial equity issuance, in our model, Home can lose from financial integration due to the endogenous reduction in risk sharing and aggregate shocks can generate large gross capital flows.     

On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal–Schmeidler–Vind

In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$ between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.     

Fat tails and spurious estimation of consumption‐based asset pricing models

The standard generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of Euler equations in heterogeneous‐agent consumption‐based asset pricing models is inconsistent under fat tails because the GMM criterion is asymptotically random. To illustrate this, we generate asset returns and consumption data from an incomplete‐market dynamic general equilibrium model that is analytically solvable and exhibits power laws in consumption. Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the standard GMM estimation is inconsistent and susceptible to Type II errors (incorrect nonrejection of false models). Estimating an overidentified model by dividing agents into age cohorts appears to mitigate Type I and II errors.     

Human capital accumulation, fertility and economic development

We examine the development paths of an economy by incorporating the trade-off between the quality and quantity of children and the substitutability between the educational effect within the family and the education paid for by the parent. There is a threshold wage rate, above which individuals begin to invest in the human capital of their children, while reducing the number of children. At this point, the economy shifts from an exogenous growth phase to an endogenous growth phase. It is also shown that the aggregate saving rate is positively correlated with the youth dependency ratio in the development process.