Exploring Critical Factors of Macau's Heritage Tourism: What Heritage Tourists are Looking for when Visiting the City's Iconic Heritage Sites

Although Macau is widely stigmatized as a gambling paradise, its colonial past has left the city with a wealth of heritage and cultural attractions that can be converted into priceless tourism resources. Macau's status as world heritage city further creates opportunities for the city to develop its heritage tourism business. This requires Macau to understand heritage tourists whose needs and wants may vary from ordinary travelers. A review of the literature, however, indicates that most academic discussions of Macau heritage are from a history or conservation perspective rather than from the prism of tourism; because of this, the present study aims to explore, from a tourism perspective, the critical factors that are essential to enhance tourist experience when visiting Macau's major heritage sites.     

Identifying micro-destinations and providing statistical information: a pilot study in the Canary Islands

Municipalities and regions are often used as an object of tourism analysis at the subnational level. This occurs because administrative borders are used to implement tourism policies and collect statistical information. However, administrative boundaries may not always be suitable for studying tourism destinations at a local level. Sometimes, particularly in high-density tourism destinations, several differentiated tourism areas occupy a single municipality; tourism areas may, and often do, extend beyond municipal boundaries and tourism destinations may not occupy the whole of the municipal area. As such, a new level of analysis is often required: the micro-destination. There are few tourism concepts as imprecise as that of the destination. Therefore, the process of identifying and establishing the boundaries of a micro-destination is by no means a straightforward one. This paper presents six criteria for establishing the boundaries of this type of tourism area. Of these six, the two primary criteria used are: the concentration of tourism establishments; and tourism typologies and supply characteristics. These criteria have been applied as part of a pilot study in the Canary Islands. Statistical information for nine micro-destinations is generated using the geolocation of tourism establishments together with information obtained from both supply-side and demand-side surveys.     

On the interaction between public and private capital in economic growth

This paper introduces two forms of interaction between private and public capital in an endogenous growth model in which productive government expenditure takes the form of a stock-variable and public capital is used in part as an input in the production of final output and in part to increase its own supply. While the first form of interaction involves the stocks of the two capital-goods and takes place within the final output sector through the specification of the aggregate production function (Cobb?CDouglas vs. CES), the second one concerns the rates of investment in the two kinds of capital. The share of productive public expenditure devoted to output production can be either exogenous or endogenous. Our results suggest that when this share is exogenous, along the balanced growth path the optimal growth rate of the economy is a positive function of the degree of complementarity between the two forms of investment. When the share of productive public expenditure devoted to output production is endogenous, the public capital share in GDP becomes, along with the model??s preference parameters, an important determinant of the economy??s long run growth. We also find that the optimal growth rate is an increasing function of the elasticity of substitution between public and private capital inputs in goods production, and is independent of the complementarity/substitutability between the two forms of investment.     

Coordination and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods by Correlated Equilibria

The strategic analysis of the private provision of a discrete public good has shown the existence of multiple Nash equilibria with the efficient number of players voluntarily contributing. However the coordination issue is left unexplained by this literature. The experimental evidence shows that communication among players is helpful in achieving cooperation. We claim that, from the theoretical point of view, this is equivalent to playing correlated equilibria in an extended public good game with communication, modeled as Chicken. We characterize such equilibria as feasible coordination mechanisms to achieve public goods provision in the general contribution game. We further introduce a second kind of game characterized by payoff externalities that may persist after the minimal threshold of contributors is achieved. While it is easy to show the existence of Pareto efficient correlated equilibria in the first game, in the second one players face incentive problems such that a first best cannot always be an equilibrium. Nevertheless there exist correlated equilibria that can qualify as incentive efficient mechanisms, once free riding is seen as a moral hazard issue. Finally, with an example, we discuss the impact of coalition formation in our framework.     

Microfinance and gender inequality: cross-country evidence

Microfinance enables poor women to engage in income-generating activities, which helps them become financially independent, strengthening their decision-making power within the household and society. Consequently, microfinance has the potential to reduce gender inequality (GI). Case-study evidence from across the developing world both supports and contradicts this hypothesis. We therefore revisit this issue using macroeconomic cross-country panel data for 64 developing economies over the period 2003–2014. We find that women’s participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in GI. However, regional interactions reveal that cultural factors are likely to influence the GI–microfinance nexus.     

A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.