Effects of distribution channel structure in markets with vertically differentiated products

This study examines how the structure of distribution channels may influence firms’ quality and price strategies and how they may in turn affect consumer welfare. It treats product quality as a decision variable so that the degree of product substitution becomes endogenous rather than exogenous as in previous studies. We find that, with vertically differentiated firms, the changes in channel structure have asymmetric effects depending on whether they occur in the high-quality channel or in the low-quality channel. The product quality of the high-quality channel decreases when it decentralizes unilaterally. However, product quality of the low-quality channel would increase when it decentralizes. The high-quality manufacturer and its channel suffer more from decentralization in comparison with their low-quality counterparts, and the low-quality manufacturer actually receives greater profits when both channels are decentralized. An important driver behind these asymmetries is the interaction between firms’ pricing incentives in integrated versus decentralized channels and what consumer segments they serve. Our analysis indicates that decentralization may reduce consumer welfare, but decentralization in the high-quality channel hurts consumers more than that in the low-quality channel. Therefore in a competitive environment where firms make both quality and price decisions, channel integration would have significant welfare enhancement effects through the elimination of double marginalization, especially if it happens in the high-quality channel. Moreover, we demonstrate that once quality is endogenized, integration is the only equilibrium of channel structure choices. This suggests that the private incentives of firms may actually benefit consumers but do not have to be in line with the general preference of industry regulation for decentralization.     

A processual analysis of the purchasing and supply organization in transition: the impact of offshoring

Many companies have resorted to offshoring in order to reduce costs and grow their global market presence. Yet it remains unclear what impact the offshoring strategy has on the purchasing and supply organization (PSO) of these companies. In this paper the nature and type of changes offshoring organizations make within the PSO are examined, i.e. how new purchasing and supply management (PSM) structures and practices emerge, are maintained or are discarded as production operations are relocated. The processual perspective is used to analyze empirical data from a rich, in-depth case study within a global engineering company. Results suggest that in line with the law of requisite variety the PSO changes thoroughly when the company relocates its production activities through the captive offshoring mode, but does so in a more disjointed and non-linear manner than the current stage models would suggest. The offshoring process provides momentum for PSO change and influences where and how the change happens. We present five propositions for further research and conclude that offshoring provides managers with opportunities to: (i) change and influence the strategic direction of PSM in their organizations, and (ii) build viable strategies of retaining and managing knowledge and PSM competencies in global operations.     

Competition and Participation in Religious Markets: Evidence from Victorian Scotland

In 1885, the largest churches in Scotland were engaged in a dispute about state funding. We use data generated in the course of that dispute to test two related hypotheses. First, as market size (proxied by population) increases, the competitiveness (or complexity) of the religious market structure will not decrease. Second, religious activity, as measured by giving per member, church income and participation, will not decrease as market competitiveness (or complexity) increases. Empirical evidence lends support to the first hypothesis, but casts doubt on the second, and the supply-side theories underpinning it, which posit a causal link between increased competitiveness (complexity) and higher levels of religious activity. In interpreting the results the importance of a rich understanding of institutional arrangements—particularly market structure, governance and financing—is underlined.     

On price equilibrium with multi-product firms

In this paper, we provide a result that shows existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in cases in which existing methods are problematic. This result is based on a theorem by Kellogg (Proc Am Math Soc 60:207–210, 1976) that provides conditions for the existence of a unique fixed point. We apply it to the simple logit discrete choice model and the CES representative consumer model, where asymmetric cost firms produce multiple vertically and horizontally differentiated products and compete in prices.     

Bringing Unemployed Back to Work: Effective Active Labor Market Policies

We present a theoretical analysis of different types of active labor market policies in the context of a search-matching model. We find that labor market training is effective in bringing down unemployment while public employment services and subsidized jobs are not effective at all. This theoretical finding is confirmed in an explorative empirical analysis using data from 20 OECD countries.     

Measuring Lifetime Redistribution in Dutch Occupational Pensions

Summary  This paper assesses how the Dutch system of occupational pensions redistributes between and within generations. The approach in this paper deviates from the usual approach by incorporating the full life cycle in the measurements, rather than only the annual effects. In order to quantify redistribution, we use the level of educational attainment, gender and age to classify the pension fund population. For all groups distinguished, we measure in present value terms the average net benefit from participating in occupational pensions. The results indicate a sizable redistribution from males to females and from low educated to higher educated workers. On a lifetime basis, the impact of intergenerational transfers is modest. I am grateful to the two anonymous referees, Ed Westerhout, Casper van Ewijk, Lex Meijdam, Yvonne Adema and Peter Kooiman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Andre Nibbelink for his valuable computational assistance.     

The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives

Summary  The number of risks that are taken into account by risk managers has grown over the years, but they still have a blind spot for the danger that remuneration schemes and financial incentives can lead to more risk taking. Such an effect constitutes a regime change, making standard statistical analyses of previous data obsolete. Common remuneration contracts for hedge fund managers and bank traders provoke risk taking and lead to volatile results. The incentive structure of rating agencies sheds doubts on the quality of their judgment. Risk managers should address the behavioral effects of incentive schemes, both inside and outside their firm. Incentive schemes should be corrected in such a way that only long-term results pay off. CEO, ABN-AMRO Bank and former Minister of Finance. These comments were prepared for the occasion of the Jelle Zijlstra Lecture by Martin Hellwig at the VU University, Amsterdam, May 27, 2008, when Gerrit Zalm was CFO of DSB Bank.     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

A note on χ-values

In this note, we generalize the χ^Sh-value for all efficient TU-values