Fixed-Term Contracts and Labor Market Duality in France

The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant. A large part of the wage gap between permanent and temporary workers remains unexplained by observable characteristics. They receive less on-the-job training and their likelihood of obtaining a stable job is lower than 30% after 1 year and a half. They have also a higher probability of being the adjustment variable in case of an economic negative shock. These different findings show the importance of using public policies to encourage transitions from fixed-term to permanent employment and reducing labor-market duality.     

Migration,FDI, and Welfare

We investigate migration and foreign direct investment (FDI) for a small trading economy. Historically, immigration in small countries has been accompanied by FDI inflows (complementary capital movements). Based on the skill composition of migrants, empirical evidence finds that skilled immigration is accompanied by FDI inflows but unskilled immigration is accompanied by FDI outflows (substitutable capital movements). We prove that the Heckscher-Ohlin model cannot reconcile these apparently contradictory observations. We introduce a theoretical model in which capital and unskilled labor are sector specific, and demonstrate that this model can reconcile the historical and empirical observations on migration and FDI.     

Corporate Governance and CEO Innovation

A fundamental concern emerging from the corporate literature is the agency problem of innovation. While innovation is considered as a major driver of corporate growth and profitability, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has an intrinsic reluctance to pursue innovation projects. The thrust of this paper is to identify the mechanisms of corporate governance which help attenuate this problem, thereby encouraging the CEO to have the propensity to innovate. The empirical results suggest that firms with a widespread dispersion of shares among shareholders are less likely to encourage the CEO to innovate. The likelihood of innovation appears to increase, however, in the presence of a large shareholder. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, there appears to be no association between innovation and board independence. The same result holds for board size. Also, a diverse board appears to negate CEO predisposition to innovate. On the other hand, innovation increases when the CEO is not the Board Chair but has equity ownership, although the incentive effect is economically small. The paper uses a sample of domestically-owned, publicly-listed Australian firms over the period 1994–2003.     

Why Are Input-Output Tables Important?

The new input-output tables published by Rosstat for 2011–2015 are indeed an achievement worth celebrating. These tables form a comprehensive picture of the economy that show how its many parts are connected. They serve as a basis for national accounts and for envisioning possible futures for the economy.     

Can countries rely on foreign saving for investment and economic development?

Contrary to widespread presumption, a surprisingly large number of countries have been able to finance a significant fraction of their investment for extended periods using foreign finance. While many of these episodes are in countries where official finance is important, we also identify episodes where a substantial fraction of domestic investment is financed by private capital inflows. Although there is evidence of a positive growth effect of such inflows in the short run, that positive impact dissipates after 5 years and turns negative over longer horizons. Many such episodes end abruptly, with compression of the current account and sharp slowdowns in investment and growth. Summing over the inflow (current account deficit) episode and its aftermath, we find that growth is slower than when countries rely on domestic savings. The implication is that financing growth and investment out of foreign savings, while not impossible, is risky and too often counterproductive.