UNEMPLOYMENT,LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS,AND RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION

It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within‐cell wage dispersion.     

On discretion versus commitment and the role of the direct exchange rate channel in a forward-looking open economy model

Abstract

This paper compares optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment in an economy where the direct exchange rate channel is operative. The stabilization bias under discretion is shown to be weaker in an open economy relative to a closed economy. In an open economy, a ‘less conservative central banker’, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behaviour of real output that eventuates under commitment. Evaluating the social loss function under discretion and commitment, we find that the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve mitigates the pronounced differences between the two strategies in case of high persistence in the stochastic shocks.     

The use of favors by emerging market managers: Facilitator or inhibitor of international expansion?

This article explores the use of favors by emerging market managers, the impact of using favors on their firms’ growth, legitimacy, and reputation in a variety of business environments, and how the use of favors affects firms’ paths to international expansion. We discuss the concept of favors, and to illustrate the process of favors, we look at culturally rooted examples of their use by managers from the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Utilizing neo-institutional theory, we create a typology of four types of environments in which managers and firms from emerging markets conduct business with various relational entities (e.g., governments, customers, suppliers, competitors, alliance partners). We posit that the use of favors by managers compensates for the relatively weak legitimacy of formal institutions in emerging market environments, with favors illustrating the resulting reliance upon informal cultural-cognitive institutions. We develop propositions regarding the impact of the use of favors on the organizational outcomes of growth, legitimacy, and reputation of emerging market firms doing business in each of the four environments. This leads to further propositions regarding how the use of favors can influence their firms’ internationalization growth paths. We conclude that the impact of favors on international growth paths results from the fit or non-fit of their use with the level of legitimacy of the formal institutional environment of the focal relational entity in various business transactions.     

On the persistence of job creation in old and new firms

We analyze the persistence of new jobs in new and old firms. This measure assesses the sustainability of job creation in different circumstances. We find that new jobs in Austria last significantly longer in new than in old firms.     

Innovation success of non-R&;D-performers: substituting technology by management in SMEs

This paper investigates the impact of in-house R&D and innovation management practices on innovation success in small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). While there is little doubt about the significance of technology competence for generating successful innovations, in-house R&D activities may be a particular challenge for SMEs due to high risk exposure, high fixed costs, high minimum investment and severe financial constraints. SMEs may thus opt for refraining from R&D and relying more on innovation management tools in order to achieve innovation success. We analyse whether such a strategy can pay off. Based on data from the German CIS, we find that R&D activities are a main driver for innovation success if combined with external R&D, using external innovation sources or by entering into co-operation agreements. SMEs without in-house R&D can yield a similar innovation success if they effectively apply human resource management tools or team work to facilitate innovation processes.

PUBLIC DEBT AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL WITH REAL WAGE RIGIDITIES

We present an endogenous growth model with public capital, public debt and real wage rigidities due to labor market imperfections. Assuming that the primary surplus relative to gross domestic produce (GDP) is a positive function of the debt to GDP ratio, we study growth and employment effects of deficit‐financed public investment using simulations as well as how fiscal policy affects stability of the economy. Further, we contrast the growth rate and the unemployment rate in the deficit scenario with that of the balanced budget scenario. Finally, we compare our results with those obtained in case of flexible wages and full employment.     

Standard Oriented Environmental Policy: Cost-Effectiveness and Incentives for 'Green Technology'

Abstract. In their seminal 1971 paper, W. J. Baumol and W. E. Oates analyzed effluent charges and 'command and control' regarding their ability to attain a given standard of environmental quality at minimum cost. In the subsequent literature,transferable discharge permits (TDPs) have been added to the portfolio of standard oriented environmental policy instruments. We place these instruments in a dynamic context. Here, cost minimization is defined in an intertemporal setting allowing for induced technical change. It turns out that the relative performance of alternative policy instruments regarding their 'dynamic cost-effectiveness' crucially depends on the information available to the involved agents. Under adverse informational conditions,only a TDP system with future markets is dynamically cost-effective.     

Escalating penalties: a supergame approach

The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyze the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within a supergame framework, in which the legal authority is assumed to minimize the social costs of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at an exogenously given maximal tolerable level.     

Transfer pricing under asymmetric information

This paper analyses optimal transfer prices in a firm organized in two divisions. The production costs of the divisions are their respective private information. The objective of headquarters is to determine the transfer pricing method that maximizes total profit less managers' compensation. Managers are interested in their current compensation and in the market evaluation of their experience. In this setting, the paper discusses why particular transfer pricing methods found in practice and literature may induce-inefficiencies, and it identifies conditions under which each method is preferable. Major results are: a market-based transfer price does not implement the first-best solution if there are benefits from internal trade; cost-based transfer,prices may achieve first-best, and they are preferable to negotiated transfer prices if communication is cost-less; dual transfer prices do not implement the first-best solution, as long as collusion cannot be discouraged.

‘There are two truisms in business. Transfer prices are wrong and charges for corporate overhead are too high.‘¹