Geodesics on the equilibrium manifold

We show the existence of a Riemannian metric on the equilibrium manifold such that a minimal geodesic connecting two (sufficiently close) regular equilibria intersects the set of critical equilibria in a finite number of points. This metric represents a solution to the following problem: given two (sufficiently close) regular equilibria, find the shortest path connecting them which encounters the set of critical equilibria in a finite number of points. Furthermore, this metric can be constructed in such a way to agree, outside an arbitrary small neighborhood of the set of critical equilibria, to any given metric with economic meaning.     

The compliance model of employment standards enforcement: an evidence‐based assessment of its efficacy in instances of wage theft

This article critically assesses the compliance model of employment standards enforcement through a study of monetary employment standards violations in Ontario, Canada. The findings suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organisation of work deepen insecurity for employees, models of enforcement that emphasise compliance over deterrence are unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy employment standards violations.     

Neuerscheinungen versicherungswissenschaftlicher Bücher

Ohne Zusammenfassung Ausgew?hlt von Dr. Andrea Uber, Berlin     

Reputational Herding in Financial Markets: A Laboratory Experiment

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat [2008], career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment behavior, but not investors' ability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously. We find that a sizable fraction of investors follows an established trend even in a setting where there are no reputational incentives. In a setting where there are reputational concerns, they do not seem to create substantial herd behavior.     

Assessing financial distress dependencies in OTC markets: a new approach using trade repositories data

In this paper, we study the relationships among financial market sub-segments as a way to identify potential financial distress through increased co-movements among them. To study how sub-markets are mutually co-dependent, we combine granular data on over-the-counter derivatives by trade repositories and the joint probability of distress (JPoD) approach introduced by the International Monetary Fund. We define an indicator that combines several distress drivers and observe that results on co-dependencies are similar to those that would be expected: similarities between financial and contractual terms seem to be responsible for stronger co-movements among sub-markets. However, high values for JPoD even in correspondence of quite dissimilar sub-markets suggest the presence of other drivers that should be investigated in future research. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on systemic risk assessment based on micro-founded trade repositories’ data on interest rate swaps.     

The Strategic Interplay Between Bundling and Merging in Complementary Markets

In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the competitive pressure in the market, either the firms within both pairs merge, with or without bundling, or only one pair merges and bundles, whereas the other one remains independent. The latter case can be harmful for consumers as overall prices surge. We also consider the case where a pair moves before the other. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where the first movers merge, but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Union Strategies,National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour in Italian and US Plants

This article analyses variation in the use of temporary labour based on a comparison of two plants of the same US automotive multinational corporation, one in Italy and the other in the United States. We argue that differences in the use of temporary labour are explained by union capacities to make trade‐offs between alternative forms of flexibility as well as trade‐offs in the protection of internal and external groups of workers. Union capacity is dependent on the availability of power resources within different national institutional environments. These resources are shown to influence not only the ways in which temporary workers are used but also bargaining outcomes — including employment conditions — benefiting them.