VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF SEGMENT INFORMATION: FURTHER AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE

This study provides further empirical evidence on incentives for Australian firms to voluntarily report segment information. Various economic reasons why firms may elect to present segment information have been hypothesised in previous research. Bradbury [1992] and McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] found firm size, minority interest and industry membership as significant identifiable characteristics motivating voluntary segmental disclosure. Variables found to be insignificant in Bradbury [1992] which were not examined by McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] are tested in this paper. Hypotheses relating to size, financial leverage, assets-in-place, earnings volatility, ownership diffusion, outside equity (minority) interest, overseas association as well as diverse and mining and oil classification hypotheses are empirically examined. Univariate tests and multivariate logit analysis suggest that for a extensive sample of diversified firms, voluntary segment disclosure is significantly related to size, leverage and involvement in mining or oil activities.     

Privatisation: Let the Market Decide

Is the Government privatising efficiently? Is it floating the shares in nationalised industry economically? Will British Telecom be under-priced? Professor Davis and Roger Buckland have studied the privatisation issues of shares over five years and found large but avoidable losses. They argue that the Government's marketing technique could be improved by making less use of the large financial institutions and more use of competitive tenders.     

GAINS TO BIDDER FIRMS IN CASH AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS

This paper presents empirical test results of alternative hypotheses regarding differences in returns to shareholders of bidding firms that choose different payment methods (cash or securities). The evidence is consistent with the payment method signaling hypothesis, which asserts that when management of the bidding firm believes its own stock to be overvalued (undervalued), securities (cash) will be the preferred payment method. The results are not consistent with either the overpayment hypothesis or the present value/hubris hypothesis. The findings also explain the conflicting results reported in prior work on gains to bidding firms.     

Collusion,entry, and market shares

This paper analyzes market entry and collusion in a model of duopoly with product-specific-set-up costs. The analysis demonstrates that collusion can alter the incentives for entry deterrence. We find conditions under which an established firm will permit entry and collude with a potential entrant even though entry deterrence is a viable option under noncooperative oligopoly rules. Conditions are also specified in which entry will be effectively impeded and collusion will not be undertaken.