The recession of 1990: An Austrian explanation

Conclusion Deficit spending and money-supply expansion do not eliminate recessions. Theycause recessions. This fact will never be understood unless economists and government policymakers stop trying to micro-manage the economy, and start studying what their actions are doing to the structure of production. Heavy inflation of the money supply followed by sharp cutbacks change the rules right in the middle of the game for millions of businesses in the economy. For the last 40 years, government expansionary policies have stimulated industries to create false and untenable investments. These policies are followed by government corrective actions that destroy those same projects—waste the billions of dollars invested in them, and throw millions out of work. Business cycles are not an essential feature of market capitalism. They are the result of government interference with the market. In the misdirection of labor and the distortion of the structure of production during past business cycles, it was fairly easy to point to the places where the excessive expansion had occurred because it was, on the whole, confined to the capital goods industries... In contrast, the present expansion of money, which has been brought about partly by means of bank credit expansion and partly through budget deficits, has been the result of a deliberate policy, and has gone through somewhat different channels... I do not doubt that in a sense we have today the same kind of phenomenon, but the over-expansion, the undue increase of labor employed in particular occupations, is not confined to a single, clearly defined block such as the capital-goods industries. It is now spread much more widely, and the distribution is much more difficult to describe. It is a field I would wish some statistically minded economist would investigate in order to show how the process operated in particular countries. Friedrich A. Hayek     

Stable and enforceable: a new fiscal framework for the Euro area

Since the great financial crash, the need for new fiscal rules to prevent unsustainable fiscal policies is universally recognised. In practice such rules, including those in the Stability and Growth Pact, have proved to be impossible to enforce. Thus, to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies reappearing, and to prevent monetary policy from being undermined by undisciplined governments, there is a need for a framework capable of imposing fiscal discipline. This paper considers an intertemporal assignment, where fiscal policy focuses on long-term objectives and monetary policy on short-term stabilisation. We argue for public sector debt targets as a practical way to achieve such a set up, and an excess debt protocol is constructed to give enforceable form to those targets. The ideas of “fiscal space” and optimal debt levels are used to provide a mechanism for identifying a stable region within which the debt targeting regime should operate. Making these factors explicit would both improve the credibility of planned fiscal policies and reduce risk premia on borrowing costs. We finally show how Europe’s competitiveness pact, and debt restructuring operations, can be used to maximise the available fiscal space.     

Is the European union a natural currency area, or is it held together by policy makers?

Is the European Union a Natural Currency Area, or Is It Held Together by Policymakers? — In 1999, EMU started with 11 members, but with considerable uncertainty about the depth of the convergence between them. The optimal currency area literature stresses the need for shocks which are symmetric and of similar size across countries. Our results show that symmetries in the core are only marginally stronger than those in the periphery; and that these symmetries have been increasingly maintained by policy interventions. Consequently, Europe may evolve into an optimal currency area; but the symmetries will be policy-induced rather than a market phenomenon. This suggests a fragility which could be reflected in the value of the new currency.     

External Imbalances and Fiscal Fragility in the Euro Area

This paper presents two views of the European sovereign debt crisis. The first is that countries in the South of the Eurozone were fiscally irresponsible and failed to implement pro-competitive supply side policies. The second view holds that the crisis reflects a deep divide between the external surpluses of the North and external deficits of the South. Basic stylized facts cast doubt on the explanation based on the first thesis alone. A relatively simple model shows how poor fundamentals can create a debt problem independently of fiscal responsibility. The empirical analysis of the determinants of government bond yield spreads relative to Germany suggests that both views in fact provide useful insights into the roots of the current sovereign crisis. However, differences in growth and competitiveness and capital flows between North and South have assumed a much more dominant role since the onset of the global crisis.     

The impact of cultural environment on entry-level auditors’ abilities to perform analytical procedures

We focus on the impact of three of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism, on the results of analytical procedures conducted by entry-level auditors in Mexico and the U.S. Analytical procedures are ideal for this research as they require auditors to use professional judgment and appropriate levels of professional skepticism, abilities related to all three cultural characteristics. We find no other study investigating the impact of culture on the application of auditing procedures similar across the studied cultures.We find cultural characteristics do not affect the participants’ abilities to predict income statement balances, but they may influence the ability to predict changes in balance sheet accounts. We also find culture is associated with differences in risk assessments. Our results indicate that participants rarely differentiate accounts that change according to expectation from those that change contrary to expectation, but rather alter their risk assessments to match the direction of balances that increase or decrease.