Impacts of the End of the Coffee Export Quota System on International‐to‐Retail Price Transmission

We examine the impact of the end of the coffee export quota system (EQS) on international‐to‐retail price transmission in France, Germany and the United States. We take account of the existence of long‐run threshold effects and short‐run price transmission asymmetries (PTAs). We find evidence of threshold effects in both periods (EQS and post‐EQS) in all three countries and the presence of short‐run PTAs during the post‐EQS period in all countries, but not during the EQS period. Our results indicate that the threshold values are smaller in the post‐EQS period, suggesting that retail prices became more responsive to changes in international prices. However, the speed of adjustment towards the long‐run equilibrium decreases during the post‐EQS period in the three countries. In the short run, non‐linear impulse response analyses indicate that a shock in international prices was more persistent during the EQS period than in the post‐EQS period. Moreover, we find evidence of short‐run PTAs in the post‐EQS period, with differences across countries. We find support for the ‘rockets and feathers’ principle in the United States; in contrast, retail prices respond faster when international prices are falling in Germany and France. We explain these differences in terms of market structures.     

On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach

Summary We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.The authors wish to thank William Thomson, Salvadpr Barberá, José Angel Silva and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The remaining errors are our exclusive responsibility. Financial support from DGICYT under project PB 91-0756 and the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas is gratefully acknowledged.     

Stock prices,production and interest rates: Comparison of three European countries with the USA

This paper investigates the relationships between stock returns, changes in production, and changes in interest rates in three European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The results obtained using annual data are much more conclusive than those obtained using quarterly data. Stock returns are affected by current changes in interest rates and by future changes in production. The dependence on changes in interest rates seems to be higher than on changes in production. Furthermore, the influence of future changes in production on stock returns diminishes substantially when contemporaneous changes in interest rates are taken into account. With reference to these points, the European markets behave in a similar fashion, but are in sharp contrast with the U.S. market.I am very grateful to Kay Davidson, Patric Hendershott and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. I am solely responsible for all remaining errors.     

Modeling Cyclical Asymmetries in European Imports

This paper applies smooth transition models to capture the nonlinear behavior in the imports data of six major European economies and to assess whether such nonlinearities are related to business cycle asymmetries. Two classes of switch between regimes are considered: endogenously determined transition that assumes nonlinearities are generated by idiosyncratic components specific to foreign trade, and exogenous transition based on GDP growth as a more direct indicator of the cyclical state of the economy. The results support the proposition that the dynamics of imports are nonlinear. In Belgium, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, regimes change over the business cycle, while in Germany and Italy the switch between regimes is endogenous. National characteristics play a role in defining the position of extreme regimes, the smoothness of the transition, and local dynamics within each state.Previous versions of this article have been presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference (Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14, 2004) and at the VII Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Vigo, Spain, June 3–5, 2004). The authors thank the conference participants and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

What Prevents Firms from Advancing in their Environmental Strategy?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the strategic environmental behavior of firms and, more specifically, the external and internal barriers that limit and sometimes even prevent the environmental adaptation. The analysis focuses on a sample of industrial firms that have at least three workers and that are located in Aragón, a region situated in the northeast of Spain. In order to achieve this objective, first the theoretical literature on the topic is reviewed. Subsequently, from the firms which were sampled, the existence of an underlying structure among the totality of barriers is studied. Finally, this structure is analyzed in order to determine if it has any influence on the degree of proactivity of the firm’s environmental strategy.

Returns from social capital in open source software networks

Open Source Software projects base their operation on a collaborative structure for knowledge exchange in the form of provision or reception of information, expertise and feedback on the creation of source code. Here, we address the direction of these knowledge flows among projects throughout social networks and their impact on project success. We identify the roles of membership or contribution that individuals play within projects. We found that connections through contributors who bring their knowledge to the project, improve project success, and that connection through members, who transfer their knowledge towards other projects, enhance project success. Finally, we found that ties through shared membership and contributions hamper project success. The analysis of knowledge flows and their impact on project success imply a translation of returns from investment in social capital, where investment takes the shape of knowledge flows and the returns mean the projects’ diffusion over the network.

ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS

We consider strategy‐proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops‐onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single‐peakedness (referred to as semilattice single‐peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single‐peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well‐known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy‐proof rules are admissible are semilattice single‐peaked domains.     

Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets

We introduce two novel matching mechanisms, Reverse Top Trading Cycles (RTTC) and Reverse Deferred Acceptance (RDA), with the purpose of challenging the idea that the theoretical property of strategy-proofness induces high rates of truth-telling in economic experiments. RTTC and RDA are identical to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms, respectively, in all their theoretical properties except that their dominant-strategy equilibrium is to report one’s preferences in the order opposite to the way they were induced. With the focal truth-telling strategy being out of equilibrium, we are able to perform a clear measurement of how much of the truth-telling reported for strategy-proof mechanisms is compatible with rational behaviour and how much of it is caused by confused decision-makers following a default, focal strategy without understanding the structure of the game. In a school-allocation setting, we find that roughly half of the observed truth-telling under TTC and DA is the result of naïve (non-strategic) behaviour. Only 14–31% of the participants choose actions in RTTC and RDA that are compatible with rational behaviour. Furthermore, by looking at the responses of those seemingly rational participants in control tasks, it becomes clear that most lack a basic understanding of the incentives of the game. We argue that the use of a default option, confusion and other behavioural biases account for the vast majority of truthful play in both TTC and DA in laboratory experiments.