Cost and trade impacts of environmental regulations: effluent control and the New Zealand dairy sector

New Zealand legislation sets standards for water quality. Nitrogen leaching from dairy effluent compromises these standards, with the consequent move being toward land-based effluent disposal. The cost of this to the dairy sector was estimated and a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model (GTAP) was used to investigate the impact of additional production costs on NZ's dairy export trade. Two scenarios were analysed: first, NZ acts unilaterally in imposing water quality regulations, second, the other principal dairy exporters act in a similar fashion. Changes in trade patterns vary from insignificant to large, depending on the scenario analysed.     

Die Arbeitsteilung als Grundproblem der Nationalökonomie bei Ernst Ludwig Carl (1722)

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Market imperfections and crowdfunding

Small Business Economics - This article is the first one that considers the choice between the different types of crowdfunding and traditional financing under different types of market...     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.     

History of Thought as Ceremonial Genealogy: The Neglected Influence of Herbert Spencer on Thorstein Veblen

Large corporations are invariably structured as formal institutions, and this formality is reflected in organizational charts. These charts depict a multilevel managerial hierarchy of authority within the organization typified, in the simplest case, by a pyramid. Many economic and business researchers attribute formality to a desire for greater efficiency, although I do not take this position in the present paper. Instead, I agree with researchers who connect formality with organizational legitimacy. I further argue that personal interests are at work in bigness and formalization. Top managers are motivated by desire for power and prestige. Formality furthers these objectives by rigidly fixing relations and ranks within the organization. Widespread belief in efficiency and legitimacy converge with personal motives to encourage and entrench formality. Corporate size and structure are seen as having deleterious effects on employees and society at large. But they also have some negative impacts on those at the top.     

Sectoral Interests and Global Money: Renminbi, Dollars and the Domestic Foundations of International Currency Policy

In deciding whether to support an international role of their country’s currency, national policymakers are often influenced by lobbying from domestic sectoral groups. While these groups will be consistently more interested in some implications of international currency issuance than others, their specific preferences are likely to be highly context specific. Looking at the cases of the United States and China, we anticipate that domestic sectoral lobbying is unlikely to pressure either the US government to defend the dollar’s international role vigorously or the Chinese government to internationalize the renminbi fully. From this domestic sectoral perspective, the future looks to be characterized by reluctant monetary leaders rather than increasingly aggressive currency competition between the United States and China.     

The investment effects of price caps under imperfect competition: A note

We examine the impact of price cap regulation on the capacity investments of oligopolistic suppliers facing time-varying demand. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment.     

Budgetdefizite und Finanzierungsüberschüsse

In den Stabilit?ts- und Wachstumspakt ist die 3%-Defizitgrenze für den Staatshaushalt vor allem deshalb eingebaut worden, weil eine zu hohe Beanspruchung des gemeinsamen Kapitalmarktes der Eurozone verhindert werden sollte. Welche Erkenntnisse lassen sich zur tats?chlichen Inanspruchnahme des Kapitalmarktes aus den Finanzierungssalden der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung gewinnen? Wie ist bei solch einer Betrachtung das Argument der Generationengerechtigkeit zu beurteilen? Welche Folgen h?tte gegenw?rtig eine Haushaltskonsolidierung?     

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent     

Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests

The neoclassical approach toward explaining domination in the market is confronted with the approach of critical theory. Special attention is paid to domination by virtue of a constellation of interests in the market. This requires a particular technique for imposing will, namely conditional access to the market field. Interactions are modeled taking a field of domination composed of three organizational actors, one of them performing the function of drawing boundaries and controlling access. The concept of territoriality as spatially embedded power is applied to organization studies. Only one actor in the field has the ability to maximize its satisfaction, the two others minimize missed opportunities.