Information value and externalities in reputation building

In sequential equilibrium theory, reputation building is independent of whether the reputation builder is matched with one long-run partner or a series of short-run “strangers”. We observe, however, that reputation builders are significantly more challenged by long-run players in both laboratory chain store and buyer-seller games. Reputation builder behavior is more predictable than implied by equilibrium, and so reputation information has more economic value than implied by equilibrium. For short-run players, this reputation information value is an externality. For long-run players, the value of the information is internalized and so they have greater incentive to challenge the reputation builder.     

Germany before and after unification: A structural VAR analysis

Recent theoretical research in business cycle modelling has aimed at putting forward a unified framework for studying both short-term cycles and long-term growth. Empirical research based on structural vector-autoregression has established that the same factors which drive long-run growth also explain a large proportion of the movements of key macro variables at business cycle frequencies. The present paper aims at applying this approach to study the determinants of the post-unification downturn in Germany. The results suggest that German business cycles were not all alike. Whilst adverse supply shocks clearly matter before unification, it is primarily adverse aggregate demand shocks and a too tight monetary policy which dominate the German post-unification decline in output growth rates.     

Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?

A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.     

Start für anspruchsvolles Klimaregime

Ohne Zusammenfassung Axel Michaelowa, Perspectives GmbH