The prosumers and the grid

Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insufficient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges: a net metering system that uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and imports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers, compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to synchronize local production and consumption.     

Retailer Dominance and Quality Variation: Observations and a Theoretical Explanation

A number of consumer and business reports suggest that slightly lower quality (or feature) versions of products are being sold through dominant retailers, while higher quality versions continue to be sold through weaker retailers and, customers are uninformed about such subtle differences. We study two intriguing questions based on this phenomenon namely (1.) why are lower quality-lower priced versions sold primarily through dominant retailers and not the weaker retailers? (2.) Why do sometimes the weaker retailers not inform customers about these quality differences? Using a game theoretic model, we find that when quality is noncontractible an increase in retail dominance leads to a decrease in quality offered by the dominant retailer vis-à-vis the weaker retailer. However, we show that the weaker retailer does not have an incentive to advertise its higher quality if quality differences are not too high. This situation arises endogenously when the dominant retailer is not too powerful as compared to the weaker retailer or when retail differentiation is high. The motivation for this result is traced to the threat of increased competition in the event of such advertising.     

The Effect of Tax Preparation Expenses for Employees: Evidence from Germany

Using a panel of German income tax accounting data from taxpayers with no business income (employees), we find a negative relationship between tax preparation expenses and tax liabilities. However, preparation expenses are shown to exceed estimated tax savings. Specifically, one additional Euro spent on preparation yields an estimated tax savings of 72 cents in an OLS regression and 24 cents in a fixed effects regression. In addition, we observe substantial heterogeneity in tax savings among income groups, but even if we account for long‐term tax savings, tax liability reductions exceed tax preparation expenses only for the highest income quintile. In all other income quintiles, average preparation expenses exceed the estimated tax and time savings. Based on these results, we also examine whether other specific benefits affect an individual's decision to purchase tax preparation services, and the results indicate the importance of the benefits of coping with complexity and reduced uncertainty. Overall, our findings illustrate that the current tax compliance process violates at least two of Adam Smith's principles of taxation, taxes are neither certain nor fair.     

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.     

Unravelling the JPMorgan spoofing case using particle physics visualization methods

On 29 September 2020, JPMorgan was ordered to pay a settlement of $920.2 million for spoofing the metals and Treasury futures markets from 2008 to 2016. We examine these cases using a visualization method developed in particle physics (CERN) and the messages that the exchange receives about market activity rather than time-based snapshots. This approach allows to examine multiple indicators related to market manipulation and complement existing research methods, thereby enhancing the identification and understanding of, as well as the motivation for, market manipulation. In the JPMorgan cases, we offer an alternative motivation for spoofing than moving the price.