A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System

This study evaluates the positive and negative features of the German public pension system and discusses three reasons for its increasing perceived and real difficulties: maturation, negative incentive effects, and the problems of demographic change. The German system in its current form may be able to limp through the coming decades but will cease to be the exemplary Bismarckian machine that has created generous retirement incomes at reasonable tax rates. Current policy proposals are insufficient and a few but incisive design changes and some degree of prefunding could rescue the many positive aspects of the German retirement insurance system.     

How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?

This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy, and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The analytics also show that the shadow economy and corruption are substitutes. The predictions of the model are empirically tested and confirmed.     

How useful is the concept of the natural real rate of interest for monetary policy?

The natural rate of interest plays a key role in Wicksell's‘cumulative process’ as well as in modern monetaryequilibrium models of the business cycle. It constitutes a usefulconcept for the theoretical analysis of the interdependenceof monetary policy and economic fluctuations. However, the usefulnessof this concept for the practice of monetary policy is limited—especiallyowing to the fact that the natural real rate of interest andits law of motion cannot be measured with satisfying precision.     

Otra Empanada en la Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia

One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share “bad news” (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross‐cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information‐sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision‐makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision‐makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision‐makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.     

Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth

In developing countries and countries in transition, a lack of finance is regarded as a major reason for the underperformance of the SME sector. The financial sector does not channel funds efficiently from savers to the most efficient investment. In a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, we explain the underperformance of the SME sector by interbank market frictions. High information costs in the interbank market lead to a high loan/deposit spread and hence to a low growth equilibrium. The solution to this problem is twofold. First, central bank policy could reduce interbank information problems by providing effective bank supervision. Second, if the central bank is expected not to have sufficient monitoring capabilities, reputation and reserves, opening up the interbank market to international banks can substitute for insufficient central bank activities.The sources of this advantage in efficiency are stronger incentives for workers and managers (direct connection between effort and return), easier monitoring and greater flexibility (McIntyre 2001).     

Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Official Financing Matter?

Using a new data set for 41 German non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), we analyse the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of official financing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that German NGOs are more active in poorer countries, while they do not complement official aid by working under difficult local conditions. Beyond a certain threshold, rising financial dependence weakens their poverty orientation and provides an incentive to engage in ‘easier’ environments. In addition, we find that the NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating aid. This herding behaviour is, however, hardly affected by the degree of official financing.