SEIGNORAGE AND EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

Inflation differentials in Europe have narrowed substantially since the inception of the European Monetary System in 1979. However, their persistence after more than a decade raises the question of why these differentials are so difficult to eliminate. Some European Community countries systematically use seignorage—financing government expenditures with money creation—while others do not. This increases the difficulty of achieving the convergence of monetary policies and inflation rates required for irrevocably fixed exchange rates in Europe. This paper, utilizing a model of government finance that minimizes the social cost of financing government expenditures, examines monetary finance in the European Community. It rejects soundly the social cost minimization model of seignorage collection.     

A Reexamination of Behavior in Experimental Audit Markets: The Effects of Moral Reasoning and Economic Incentives on Auditor Reporting and Fees*

This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third‐party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental‐markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo‐Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.     

Decision‐Making about Workplace Disputes: A Policy‐Capturing Study of Employment Arbitrators,Labor Arbitrators,and Jurors

Firms are increasingly turning to the controversial practice of employment arbitration to resolve workplace disputes. Yet little is know about how decisions are made by employment arbitrators or how their decisions compare to those made in traditional dispute‐resolution forums. This study uses a policy‐capturing design and hierarchical linear modeling to compare how decisions about termination cases are made by employment arbitrators, labor arbitrators, and jurors. The results indicate significant differences in the overall willingness to uphold termination, with labor arbitrators being the most likely to rule in favor of the employee, followed by jurors, employment arbitrators judging statutory and for‐cause claims, and employment arbitrators judging statutory‐only claims. Significant differences were also observed between categories of decision makers in the weight given to procedural compliance, evidence of discrimination, employee work history, and stress‐inducing personal circumstances.     

A SAVINGS SUBSIDISATION SYSTEM IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH: AN EXTENSION OF WIGGER (1999)

Population ageing is now an established demographic characteristic of many economies. Economists working in the endogenous growth theory tradition have sought to model the relationship between public pensions, financed on a 'Pay-As-You-Go' basis, and the growth in per capita incomes. The resultant intergenerational wealth redistribution from young to older people seems to decrease private savings, diminish capital accumulation, and lower the growth of per capita incomes. The underlying transmission mechanism appears to be a crowding out effect in private capital markets contingent upon the introduction of public pension systems. A growing literature exists on the interrelationships between public pension schemes, fertility rates and endogenous growth. Following Wigger's (1999) pioneering overlapping generations endogenous growth model, we extend this model to examine the effects of a savings subsidisation system on the rate of per capita income growth, fertility and voluntary intrafamily wealth transfers, where parents view children both as an insurance good and a consumption good. Moreover, children care about the consumption levels of their parents. An increase in contributions to a savings subsidised public pension scheme will crowd out private intergenerational transfers from the young to the old and thereby negate the usefulness of children as an insurance good.     

A MATCHED PAIRS ANALYSIS OF STATE GROWTH DIFFERENCES

The American states have provided a rich laboratory in which to examine influences on economic growth, physical capital, human capital, and a variety of policy variables. Existing studies typically use broad cross sections of all states or particular regional subsamples. Pairwise matching is an alternative design for better controlling of omitted variables. We estimate a growth model of U.S. states for 1997–2005 before and after applying different pairwise matching techniques. Our results indicate that sample estimates based on pairwise matching substantially improve the overall ability of the growth model to identify the growth‐enhancing effects of lower tax burdens in general and lower individual income‐tax rates in particular. These effects are more pronounced with narrower matching criteria. (JEL H00, C29, O40)     

Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of Alliances

In Borel’s Colonel Blotto game two players simultaneously allocate their respective endowments of a resource across n battlefields, the higher allocation wins each battlefield, and players maximize the number of battlefields won. Here we examine two players who may form an alliance before separately competing in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games against a common adversary. Despite a lack of common interests, unilateral transfers—in a direction consistent with the exploitation hypothesis—arise for a range of parameter configurations. Such transfers alter the adversary’s strategy and the combination of the direct and strategic effects benefits both allies.