Easing the assessment of emerging technologies in technology observatories. Findings about patterns of dissemination of emerging technologies on the internet

This paper considers the Web as a big data container that can be used by Technology Observatories and administrations to track emerging issues and more specifically emerging technologies. It considers information that is available on the Internet for free from different sources, and proposes a framework that can be useful to characterise them and to detect patterns of dissemination. This framework is made up of 30 metrics obtained from different kinds of sources (general web, patents, scholars?…). Some of them are obtained directly as the number of hits retrieved by queries on a search engine, and other ones calculated by means of ratios. This paper contains the development of a complete case that utilises this framework to characterise emerging technologies included in the well-known Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, in this case the 2015 release¹ and to analyze patterns of dissemination of these technologies on the Internet.     

Wage and hour violations in urban labour markets: a comparison of Los Angeles,New York and Chicago

This article compares violations of minimum wage laws and other labour standards in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago. Los Angeles has the highest violation rates, due to such factors as its industrial composition and disproportionately large number of small establishments, as well as its vast unauthorised immigrant population. In addition, Los Angeles’ higher rates reflect the stricter legal standards in California. We conclude that, although stronger workplace laws and regulations are crucial, in the absence of effective enforcement, they may fail to prevent workplace violations.     

Using propensity matching estimators to evaluate the impact of privatization on wages

Whether the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector leads to a decline or increase in wage growth is theoretically ambiguous, given that the outcome depends on the uncertain interaction between firms and workers. Using propensity matching techniques, this article investigates the effects of privatization on wages in the Portuguese banking industry. The empirical results, obtained from Quadros de Pessoal for the period between 1989 and 1997, generally show a negative (positive) short-run (long-run) effect of privatization on relative wage growth for both men and women retained in the privatized firms. Moreover, the results show that the most educated and experienced (oldest) workers, as well as those in the high skill occupational categories, were more likely to experience a negative wage effect.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

Reliable Estimates of Sovereign Rating

International Advances in Economic Research -