Budget deficits and real interest rates: Updated empirical evidence on causality

Using error-correction model (ECM) estimation, the paper empirically examines the causality relationship between the federal government budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield on high grade long term tax free municipal bonds in the U.S. To clarify this deficit or interest rate relationship, the budget deficit is measured by the primary budget deficit, which excludes net interest payments by the Treasury. In a model that includes federal personal income tax rates and net international capital flows, as well as money supply growth, the ECM estimates strongly suggest a bi-directional relationship between the primary budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield. Budget deficits apparently do matter! William Simon's concerns were justified.The author is indebted to P. A. V. B. Swamy for ideas and helpful suggestions and Will Perry for data assembly and processing.     

Quasi‐rational and ex ante price expectations in commodity supply models: an empirical analysis of the US broiler market

A statistically optimal inference about agents' ex ante price expectations within the US broiler market is derived using futures prices of related commodities along with a quasi‐rational forecasting regression equation. The modelling approach, which builds on a Hamilton‐type framework, includes endogenous production and allows expected cash price to be decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated components. We therefore infer the relative importance of various informational sources in expectation formation. Results show that, in addition to the quasi‐rational forecast, the true supply shock, future prices, and ex post commodity price forecast errors have, at times, been influential in broiler producers' price expectations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.