Resolving the Credibility Problem of an Honest Government: A Case for Foreign Investment Subsidy

We develop a simple model of direct foreign investment where the host country government cannot credibly signal its honest intention such as to stick to the contracted tax rate. The foreign firm has some prior belief regarding the ex post discretionary policies of the local government. Since the investment is completely irreversible, such a belief pattern might not induce the firm to invest in a country which badly needs it. It is shown that the host government can design a subsidy scheme which might attract foreign investment by removing the credibility problem.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,CREDIBLE POLICY: The Role of Risk Sharing

This article constructs a model of international joint ventures with risk sharing as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment, or to form a public-private joint venture with the host country government in an economy in transition. In our framework uncertain taxation is the source of risk. It is demonstrated that start-up investment cost sharing by the host country government encourages foreign investment. Joint financing of investment can act as insurance for the multinational firm because cost sharing serves as a means to sustain the credibility of government policy.     

Export and Strategic Currency Hedging

This paper examines an international Cournot duopoly wherein a home firm and a foreign firm compete in the home market under exchange rate uncertainty. The foreign exporting firm, being risk averse, has incentives to hedge its exchange rate risk exposure. In a two-stage setting, we show that hedging via an unbiased currency futures market acts as a strategic device. In particular, under either constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in the hedging volume of the foreign firm promotes its exports and deters the home firm’s output. In contrast to the well-known full-hedging result in a perfectly competitive environment, we find that the foreign firm over-hedges for strategic reasons. Furthermore, the separation result from the hedging literature under perfect competition no longer holds in our duopoly framework, i.e., equilibrium output levels depend on the risk attitude of the foreign firm as well as the probability distribution of the spot exchange rate.     

Hedging and nonlinear risk exposure

This paper documents some empirical evidence of nonlinear spot-futuresexchange rates relationships and develops an expected utilitymodel of an exporting firm to examine the associated economicimplications. The model shows that the firm should export more(less) and adopt an over (under) hedge in an unbiased currencyfutures market if the spot-futures exchange rates relationshipsis convex (concave) rather than linear. When fairly priced currencyoptions on futures are available, the firm should use them inconjunction with the currency futures so as to achieve betterhedging against its nonlinear exchange rate risk exposure. Thisprovides a rationale for the hedging role of options when theunderlying uncertainty is nonlinear in nature.     

Multinationals, Hedging, and Capital Structure under Exchange Rate Uncertainty

This paper examines the interplay of the financing and hedging decisions of a risk-averse multinational firm having a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. Exchange rate risk management of the multinational firm is shown to have direct impacts on its international capital structure decision and on its currency of denomination decision. If a currency forward market exists, the multinational firm will devise its international capital structure so as to minimize the global weighted average cost of capital. Or else the multinational firm has to rely on a money market hedge through issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic currency denominated debt, thereby resulting in a higher global weighted average cost of capital. JEL Classification Numbers: D81, F23, G32     

Price uncertainty,future markets and correlation

This paper examines the optimal trade and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm which faces concurrently hedgeable exchange rate risk and non‐hedgeable inflation risk. The macroeconomic interaction between exchange rate and domestic inflation rate risk is described by a state variable. The (strong) correlation is pivotal in determining the optimal risk management. It is shown how optimal hedging strategies are affected by state‐dependent preferences of the firm. The optimal hedge policy is to minimize the variation of marginal utility of final wealth across states of nature instead of minimizing the variance of final wealth.     

THE EFFECT OF FORWARD MARKETS ON MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

This paper presents a model of a risk averse multinational firm under exchange rate risk. The firm, which owns and controls assets in two countries, is engaged in production, sales and forward contracting whenever forward markets exist. First, we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty without any risk sharing markets. It is shown that the firm internalizes missing hedging markets by increasing foreign production and lowering foreign sales. Therefore the firm hedges by repatriating foreign profits in the form of goods. Second, the implications of the existence of forward markets of global market decisions are discussed. It is shown that a separation theorem holds. This does not imply that the multinational firm shifts all the risk into the forward exchange market.     

Imperfect Forward Markets and Hedging

This paper considers a hedging model of a risk-averse competitive firm facing output price uncertainty. Imperfections exist in forward transactions in that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function for its forward sales. We show that the optimal output and hedge ratio of the firm are, in general, not separable, and are related in a deterministic manner. We also derive some economic implications of production and hedging decisions when firms differ in their attitudes towards risk. A more risk-averse firm is shown to produce less and hedge more than a less risk-averse firm.
(J.E.L.: D21, D81).     

Banking firm and hedging over the business cycle

This paper examines the behavior of a banking firm under risk. The banking firm can hedge its risk exposure by trading futures contracts. The banking firm is risk averse and possesses a utility function defined over its end-of-period income and a state variable that denotes the business cycle of the economy. We show that the banking firm optimally opts for an over-hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the returns on the futures contracts are negatively or positively correlated with the business cycle of the economy, respectively. Thus, the business cycle of the economy is an important determinant in shaping the banking firm’s optimal hedging strategy.