Preventing competition using side payments: when non-neutrality creates barriers to entry

Network neutrality is often advocated by content providers, stressing that side payments to Internet Service Providers would hinder innovation. However, we also observe some content providers actually paying those fees. This paper intends to explain such behaviors through economic modeling, illustrating how side payments can be a way for an incumbent content provider to prevent new competitors from entering the market. We investigate the conditions under which the incumbent can benefit from such a barrier-to-entry, and the consequences of that strategic behavior on the other actors: content providers, users, and the Internet Service Provider. We also describe how the Nash bargaining solution concept can be used to determine the side payment.     

Divergence in Variety Seeking: An Exploratory Study Among International Travelers in Asia

ABSTRACT

Variety seeking is a tendency in consumer behavior in which the consumer alternates between different makes of the same item in the quest for diversity. Variety seeking and exploratory behaviors help explain tourists’ consumption behavior and choice-making methods. Some studies have focused on the choice of food, restaurants, theme parks, travel activities, or destinations, but only a few have taken place within an international context. In this study, the influence of variety seeking and exploratory buying on travelers’ consumption behavior within an international context is analyzed. In essence, Asian travelers are compared with Western travelers. Several factors, which help explain divergence in variety seeking, are included in the analysis. The results demonstrate that variety seeking and an exploratory tendency have a significant relationship with travelers’ consumption behavior (for both Asian and Western travelers). In general, customers who have a high tendency for variety seeking are less loyal; however, there is no discernible difference between Asian and Western tourists in this regard.     

Asymmetries in the flypaper effect: empirical evidence for the Flemish municipalities

Recent empirical work on US governments indicates an asymmetry in the flypaper effect: the elasticity of public spending with respect to changes in grants differs significantly for positive and negative changes. Using a panel of data on Flemish municipalities covering the period 1989–1996, we also find clear evidence of asymmetrical reactions. More precisely, the results suggest the presence of a fiscal replacement type of asymmetry: when grants grow, municipalities spend most of the additional revenue. However, when grants fall, spending is unaffected and municipalities compensate the loss through additional taxation.     

Downstream offshoring and firm-level employment

When engaging in offshoring, firms import not only intermediates they used to produce in-house but also intermediates they previously sourced from non-affiliated domestic suppliers. This leads to a negative demand shock for the latter. We label this demand shock “downstream offshoring” and develop a novel measure capturing its extent for a firm in a given upstream industry. According to our instrumental variables estimations for a rich sample of Belgian manufacturing firms for the period of 1997 to 2007, downstream offshoring has a robust negative effect on employment.     

European unification: a new proposal

My contribution presents a possibility to unify Europe based on newly emerging political units focused on solving problems rather than on historically given nation states. These Endogenous Political Entities (EPE), as they shall be called, are better suited to reach the goals of European unification as they strengthen the fundamental European values of variety and freedom. I make three propositions: to base the unification of Europe on nation states is unfortunate as the latter are responsible for the political disaster of the two World Wars; the unification must proceed in a problem-oriented manner. The constitution of Europe must allow and promote EPE to emerge specifically to deal with particular problems; the new political units can be introduced in marginal steps. Over time, a flexible and dynamic net of political entities will arise taking care of the large economic, social and cultural diversity in Europe.     

Competition in the political arena and local government performance

Competition reduces rent extraction in private-sector firms. In this article, we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local-level governments’ performance in Flanders. The results indicate that electoral competition – measured via the number of parties competing in elections – significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy. Intertemporal competition – measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time – has a similar, but weaker, positive effect. These beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments, which is shown to work against their productive efficiency. Overall, though, the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample.     

Structural Change and Wage Inequality in the Manufacturing Sector: Long Run Evidence from East Asia

This paper analyses the long run determinants of wage inequality in the manufacturing sector for a group of East Asian countries that have experienced rapid structural transformations in recent decades. In line with the skill biased technological change hypothesis, our results show that within manufacturing structural change which fosters the participation of higher skilled workers is a strong determinant of the wage premium. However, the paper also highlights an unusual feature of the East Asian model, showing how well-designed education policies, prudent macroeconomic management and selective policies towards foreign capital can help to buffer the pressure of structural change on wage inequality, even in an open economy context.     

French Retirement Reforms and Intragenerational Equity in Retirement Duration

As most developed countries, France has gone over the last 20 years through a process of pension system reforms, mainly aiming at increasing the average retirement age, through increasing the required number of contribution years or through postponing legal (minimal and/or normal) ages. Public debates over which lever should be preferred have been paramount in France, with concerns focusing on redistribution issues between high wage high life-expectancy and low-wage low life-expectancy workers. In this paper, we empirically address this issue by simulating the differentiated impacts of the past French reforms on average retirement ages across wage quartiles. Our simulations show that increasing the required duration criterion—as was done by the 1993 and 2003 reforms–have redistributive impact as regards retirement age, while increasing the normal age—as was done by the 2010 reform—has a counter-distributive impact. The redistributive impact on average of the required duration criterion however only holds thanks to the fact that disabled workers—most of them in the lowest wage quartile—are exempted from it. Last, increasing minimal age has ambiguous impacts according to gender: redistributive among women but counter-distributive among men.     

THE ROLE OF FEES IN PATENT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre‐grant) fees and renewal (or post‐grant) fees, depending on the structural context and policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of 30 patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age.