Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

Robert Wilson criticizes applied game theory's reliance on common-knowledge assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of finding detail-free mechanisms in order to eliminate this reliance. In practice this has meant restricting attention to simple mechanisms such as dominant-strategy mechanisms. However, there has been little theoretical foundation for this approach. In particular it is not clear the search for an optimal mechanism that does not rely on common-knowledge assumption would lead to simpler mechanisms rather than more complicated ones. This paper tries to fill the void. In the context of an expected revenue maximizing auctioneer, we investigate some foundations for using simple, dominant-strategy auctions.     

Stability and agreement criteria for the termination of Delphi studies

This paper addresses the question of the methodology of testing for stability between successive Delphi rounds and the necessity of doing so prior to the analysis of the level or type of consensus. Following a discussion of a hierarchical set of a criteria for determining the termination of such studies, the paper reviews some of the more common treatments of the subject in the literature. It is finally proposed that a χ² test be used to test the stability of responses between rounds. The method is demonstrated by a numerical example.     

The First U.S. Food Stamp Program: An Example of Rent Seeking and Avoiding

Abstract . Rent seeking involves the wasteful expenses incurred to secure, acquire, or maintain a monopoly position. Rent avoiding involves the expenditures undertaken to avoid the imposition of rent-seeking costs. Each represents a social cost of Tullock rectangle loss in addition to the dead-weight or Harberger triangle loss that combined to form the Harberger-Tullock trapezoid social cost. The first Food Stamp Program in the United States came about through the rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding efforts of farmers, grocers, bankers, and other economic agents and did not lead to the promotion of social welfare. The evidence of these self-interested efforts was gleaned from articles in the New York Times and government documents. The first Food Stamp Program also fits the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler, Jordan, Peltzman and others, and it involved imposed costs on economic agents as the program evolved.     

Henry George and Europe

A bstract . In the eyes of European scholars, publicists and politicians who studied Henry George's work, he, as a social philosopher , had adopted the position of the natural law philosophers of the 18th century. The latter inspired the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, as well as the poiitical philosophy of Jeffersonian democracy , the ethos of the 18th and 19th century pioneer settlers. George rejected Social Darwinism. He saw natural law as the only true and reliable basis for a just social order. Like Karl Marx he mastered Ricardian economics ; unlike Marx, George made two factors the basis of his system, labor and land. George saw that each person had a natural right —and a natural imperative for survival —to apply his or her productive capacity to the earth –as living space and as storehouse of nutrients and raw materials. The person-land relationship , he discovered, lay at the basis of human culture. And so the land's rent , now monopolized by the few, had to be appropriated to meet the needs of society, most efficiently and justly by a land value tax.     

Robustness to the unavailability of data in block designs

We present general results for finding or boundingt _maxB , the maximum number of arbitrary whole blocks of observations which can be removed from a block design, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable. The block sizes may be larger than the number of treatments. The results are applied to BBDs, reinforced BIBDs and BBDs, BTIBDs, and a series of variance balanced incomplete block designs with two block sizes. Also given for most of these designs, are results fort _max, the maximum number of arbitrary, scattered observations that can become unavailable, and still leave all of the elementary treatment contrasts estimable.The work was undertaken while Dr. Whittinghill was visiting Ohio State University, and supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences Division, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.     

Testing equality of variances in the analysis of repeated measurements

The problem of comparing the precisions of two instruments using repeated measurements can be cast as an extension of the Pitman-Morgan problem of testing equality of variances of a bivariate normal distribution. Hawkins (1981) decomposes the hypothesis of equal variances in this model into two subhypotheses for which simple tests exist. For the overall hypothesis he proposes to combine the tests of the subhypotheses using Fisher's method and empirically compares the component tests and their combination with the likelihood ratio test. In this paper an attempt is made to resolve some discrepancies and puzzling conclusions in Hawkins's study and to propose simple modifications.
The new tests are compared to the tests discussed by Hawkins and to each other both in terms of the finite sample power (estimated by Monte Carlo simulation) and theoretically in terms of asymptotic relative efficiencies.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY

Abstract. This paper examines two important recent developments in the theory of natural monopoly, or more generally the theory of market structure. The first is a series of papers, involving Baumol with various co-authors, investigating the theory of industry structure, whilst the second is particularly associated with the names of Shaked and Sutton, and the relationship they develop between product differentiation and industry structure. The paper surveys and to some extent contrasts these two new approaches.
Baumol et al. 's contribution is seen to be in the area of clarifying the concept of natural monopoly, refining the definitions of multiproduct costs, and developing a notion of social efficiency applicable to industries where economies of scale are important. Shaked and Sutton employ a new definition of natural monopoly unrelated to market size and utilize information about consumers'income distributions to develop their notion of vertical product differentiation and natural oligopoly.