An equitable,efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions

We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo ratio of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in the proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that fully internalize the global externality. Although based on an admittedly ideal scheme, these results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for various forms of transfers in international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. JEL Code: C72 · D62 · D78 · H41 · H77 · Q28     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.

Using choice question formats to determine compensable values: The case of a landfill-siting process

Siting noxious facilities, such as community landfills, is a challenging problem for local planners who recognize the importance of economic efficiency and equity, political acceptance, and meeting federal regulatory standards. Meeting these criteria requires technical and socio-economic analyses in conjunction with public input. Planners may also recognize that political acceptance requires compensation for the host community, either in the form of monetary or in-kind transfers. Following Breffle and Rowe [Breffle, W.S., Rowe. R.D., 2002. Comparing choice question formats for evaluating natural resource tradeoffs. Land Econ. 78 (2), 298–314], we use a “resource-to-resource” paired-comparison survey method to estimate compensatory values associated with an in-county landfill for both the host and non-host communities. Our results indicate that while a host-community household's minimum willingness to accept payment for hosting a landfill may exceed a non-host-community household's maximum willingness to pay, a large difference in population sizes between the two communities enables the landfill to pass a Kaldor potential compensation test.     

Irrational principals

Timothy Besley’s Principled Agents? carefully surveys the modern social science literature on political agency problems and tries to chart a sensible middle course between the naive assumption that politicians maximize the public welfare and the pessimism of Virginia-style public choice. However, the literature that Besley showcases is seriously flawed. By building on the empirically discredited rational expectations assumption, it neglects the strongest normative argument against political accountability and overlooks the extent to which “agency failures” stem from principal negligence.     

Carbon sequestration and permit trading on the competitive fringe

This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration policy literature. First and foremost, we develop a theoretical framework in which sequestration and permit-trading markets are analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. Our framework formalizes the linkage between regulatory policy changes (as they manifest themselves in the permit market) and subsequent equilibrium allocations in the sequestration market. Second, we perform a numerical analysis demonstrating the role market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of the equilibrium sequestration allocation and carbon price. Both our analytical and numerical results demonstrate the importance of incorporating into empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying market structure.     

Impure public goods,matching grant rates and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility

We examine the decentralized provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar in certain respects to both the European Union and the United States. The central authority redistributes income and provides matching grants on a per rate basis after it observes the regions’ contributions to the impure public good. Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments’ policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region. We show that the allocations of the impure public good and the population are generally efficient in a federation with decentralized leadership.     

Probability and the synthetic <Emphasis Type="Italic">a Priori</Emphasis>: A reply to block

Conclusion Contrary to Block, the synthetic a priori has little to do with our dispute. My critique of the Austrians is not that their methods are “unscientific,” but that their most distinctive positions are false or overstated. Yet Block’s latest reply does inadvertently make Austrian economics more reasonable. If synthetic a priori claims vary in degree of probability, they can no longer be treated as scientifically superior to empirical claims. Furthermore, while empirically testing absolutely certain synthetic a priori claims is pointless, empirically testing uncertain synthetic a priori claims is not. As is often the case with Austrians, Block is better at criticizing neoclassicals than he is at producing a sound alternative. He is right that most economists do not practice the logical positivism that they preach. He is also correct to maintain that logical positivism is mistaken. However, both of these problems can be resolved if neoclassical economists themselves adopt the Bayesian model of belief formation that they routinely apply to everyone else.     

Has Leviathan Been Bound? A Theory of Imperfectly Constrained Government with Evidence from the States

This paper develops a formal theory that combines power-maximizing “Leviathan” political parties with well-defined imperfections in the political process. The model implies that both parties tend to make government larger as their likelihood of electoral victory increases. Empirical tests on state-level data confirm this prediction. Racing the Leviathan hypothesis against alternative theories of party motivation indicates that both the Leviathan and the “contrasting ideologies” views have some degree of validity.