On causality in the size-efficiency relationship: the effect of investor cash flows on the mutual fund industry

One of the perceived advantages in mutual fund management is the presence of economies of scale resulting from fund size. This article analyses the impact of mutual fund cash flows on the relation between size and performance, demonstrating that performance determines asymmetric variations in fund assets, particularly in mutual equity funds. Therefore, the more efficient funds generate broad enough cash flow entry that increases the relative size of the fund, leading to an implicit and positive relation between size and performance. So, if the average size over the period sample is used as a measure of size, such a relation would be biased. When the initial size is used, this bias is avoided and, in general, an insignificant relation is found between size and performance. These results are controlled by mutual fund costs using gross returns to estimate performance. The evidence is robust, and shows only weak evidence of a negative relation between size and performance for the balanced funds that is driven by a low positive relation between costs and size; precisely, the contrary that is expected from the hypothesis of the presence of economies of scale.     

Labour participation in Colombia

A model is estimated for the decision of participating in the labour market for different groups of household members: not coupled (single, divorced and widow) women and men and coupled (married and in permanent union) women and men. The differences among these groups are significant. Probit models are estimated for the period 1984?:?1–2000?:?4 using the National Housing Survey. The neoclassical static model performs fairly well in describing the empirical determinants of the decision of participating. In terms of sign and significance of estimated coefficients the best performance of the model is reached for women. In terms of prediction the model proves useful for not coupled persons. Except for the variable named ‘children aged less than six years’, all variables perform well.     

Terrorism's Role in Re-shaping Border Crossings: 11 September and the US Borders

To what extent do boundaries shape state-centred scales of discourse and action? In an attempt to answer this question, the article delves into one of the key ambiguities characterising boundaries: their being both static markers of sovereign jurisdictions and socially produced and reproduced institutions. Drawing on Foucauldian notions of ‘productive power’, and taking as a referent the Durand Line, the paper elaborates upon Robert Sack's contribution, and proposes an analytical framework that simultaneously captures, while maintaining distinct, two dimensions of territoriality: territoriality as a strategy operating in a socially emptiable space, and territoriality as it unfolds in its actuality. It argues that such framework provides insights on the multi-scalar and place-specific power relations that define the social context in which the Durand Line unfolds, offering important tools for the assessment of boundaries' role in the reproduction of society's contradictions and inequalities. The flexible territoriality of the Durand Line is defined by its simultaneous, and more or less successful, attempt at ordering space across multiple dimensions .     

Trees and decisions

Summary. The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time.Received: 23 January 2003, Revised: 2 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70. Correspondence to: Klaus RitzbergerWe are grateful to Larry Blume, Ariel Rubinstein, Jörgen Weibull, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the universities of Vienna, Salamanca, and Heidelberg for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under project P15281 is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Collective bargaining under perfect information. The negotiation of national agreements

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the data. Delays in equilibrium are the result of uncertainty about the surplus to be divided among the players and not of information asymmetries. The model fits the data well regardless of the limitations imposed by the parametric specification adopted. Our results show that agents are patient and that the advantage from proposing is large.JEL Classification: J50, C73, C78We thank Fabian Marquez, Sergio Santillan and Jose Maria Zufiaur for helping us to create the data base on Spanish National Agreements. We also thank Cesar Alonso, Juanjo Dolado, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Maia Guell, Antonio Merlo and participants at the 1999 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for very helpful comments. Jose E. Galdon thanks financial support from the following institutions: European Commission for a TMR Marie Curie Fellowship, Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia for project BEC2002-00954 and Spanish Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte for project PR2004-0057. He also thanks the hospitality of STICERD (LSE) and the IR Section (Princeton University) where part of this work was completed. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Trends and cycles of the internet evolution and worldwide impacts

In this paper we present a quantitative analysis of the evolution of some Internet and ICT evolution indicators. It focuses on the number of Internet hosts, the Internet penetration index, the ICT development index and the software/protocols development. In addition, we analyzed the series of most impacting events building up the Internet along the last fifty years. These analyses were carried out using the multi-logistic procedure recently proposed by the authors. Our results for hosts counting, penetration index and software/protocols development are compatible with the onset of some radical changes in the Internet technology to be currently underway and we forecast new growth rate peaks to occur by 2015. The software/protocols were found to having been powered by bursts of creativity with periods of the order of the Kuznets and Kondratiev economic cycles. Similar conclusions were drawn from the series of main events building up the Internet. Despite the clear signs of worldwide improvement in the ICT infrastructure and usage between 2002 and 2007 obtained from the ICT development index, its cross-correlation with the human development index (HDI) revealed the presence of a group of countries whose improvements in the operational ICT index are disconnected from their corresponding HDI improvements.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.