COLLUSION IN LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS*

A hierarchical model of collusion in local public works is presented. A local authority plans to undertake a project, delegating its construction to a construction firm. Both of them know the project's cost. However, the federal government decides whether to subsidize the project without knowing its cost. Therefore, the local authority and the constructor may agree to misreport their private information, in order to benefit from the allocation of federal grants. We show that different collusive behaviors may emerge. Then, we characterize the optimal federal grant policy. Finally, we investigate when constructing (shutting down) useless (valuable) projects is optimal.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes

Social movements have been viewed as vehicles through which the concerns of poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil society, lauded for being the means to achieve local empowerment and citizen activism, and seen as essential in holding the state to account and constituting a grassroots mechanism for promoting democracy. However, within development studies little attention has been paid to understanding how social movements can affect trajectories of development and rural livelihood in given spaces, and how these effects are related to movements’ internal dynamics and their interaction with the broader environment within which they operate. This paper addresses this theme for the case of social movements protesting contemporary forms of mining investment in Latin America. On the basis of cases from Peru and Ecuador, the paper argues that the presence and nature of social movements has significant influences both on forms taken by extractive industries (in this case mining) and on the effects of this extraction on rural livelihoods. In this sense, one can usefully talk about rural development as being co-produced by movements, mining companies, and other actors, in particular the state. The terms of this co-production, however, vary greatly among different locations, reflecting the distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral investment, as well as the varying power relationships among the different actors involved.     

GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY—UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered.     

THE EFFECTS OF COMPANY TRAINING,FURTHER EDUCATION AND THE YOUTH TRAINING SCHEME ON THE EARNINGS OF YOUNG EMPLOYEES*

Abstract This paper provides evidence on the impact of company training, of post-compulsory education and of the UK Youth Training Scheme in the late 1980's on the earnings of 21-year-old employees in England and Wales. Earnings equations are estimated for each of seven groups of employees who have followed alternative routes from compulsory education into employment, allowing for selectivity into these routes. There are several findings, including: both high parental social class and better school qualifications help to channel people into higher status routes, while high local unemployment has the opposite effect; participation in company training in long spells substantially raises wages but short spells do not; YTS participation fails to raise, and possibly substantially lowers, wages even three years after graduation compared to those who left school at 16 and went to work and received no training; there is weak evidence that, even for those that do not enter higher education, it is better to stay on at school after 16 than go into YTS.     

Dynamic and asymmetric impacts of macroeconomic fundamentals on an integrated stock market

A large body of evidence indicates that macroeconomic and financial variables are dynamically interrelated. In an international setup, we analyze the transmission mechanisms of macroeconomic shocks on the stock market of a small open economy in an increasingly integrated world. We use a time-varying vector error correction model (VECM) that allows analysis of asymmetric impacts that depend on the state of the business cycle. A special focus is directed on monetary policy surprises, where we find that foreign shocks exert a strong influence on an integrated stock market, and that the stage of the business cycle heavily affects the signals of the shocks.     

Economic policy implications of the implementation of the single European currency

As it is well known, before the next century a single European currency, the Euro, will be introduced and European products will enjoy an extensive market. Economists have focused their attention on analyzing the different costs and benefits derived from the implementation of the single currency. With regard to the benefits of such an implementation, the most important ones are as follows. The introduction of a single currency will encourage internal demand and will help economic agents save transaction costs; labor distribution will improve; there will be less uncertainty in the markets; and, lastly, it will improve economic growth if technical transmission is facilitated. But there are also problems in the implementation of the single European currency. Credit institutions, especially banks and savings banks, will lose their income from the currency exchange process. It must also be considered that the economies will depend on the higher development level of the German economy. The goal of this paper is to analyze the costs and benefits derived from the implementation of a single currency.     

Developing Countries' Changing Participation in World Trade

Recent years have seen substantial reductions in trade policyand other barriers inhibiting developing country participationin world trade. Lower barriers have contributed to a dramaticshift in the pattern of developing country trade—awayfrom dependence on commodity exports to much greater relianceon manufactures and services. In addition, exports to otherdeveloping countries have become much more important. Thesechanges have profound implications for the role played by developingcountries in the world economy and trade system.      

PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURAL EXTERNALITIES: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Using a bargaining model the interaction between agriculture and the environment is explored. Application of the model to nitrogen pollution and management agreements directs attention to the research needs for achieving more rational environmental management