Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems

We search forstrategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists aPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are unlimited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that isPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof.     

Vergleich des verallgemeinerten nichtzentralent-Tests mit dem Binomialtest

Zusammenfassung Es sei {F _,(x); –<<, >0} mitF _,(x)=F((x–)/)–F(x) eine standardisierte Verteilungsfunktion — die Familie der zulässigen Verteilungsfunktionen. Der (früher eingeführte) verallgemeinerte nichtzentralet-Test für die Hypothese {PP ₀} mitP:=F _,(x ₀) gegen die Alternative {P>P ₀} zum Niveau wird mit dem entsprechenden nichtparametrischen Test (Test für die Hypothese {pP ₀} über den Parameterp einer Binomialverteilung gegen die Alternative {p>P ₀}) verglichen. Für dent-Test wird die relative asymptotische Effizienz bestimmt.Beide Tests lassen sich als Tests für das zur WahrscheinlichkeitP ₀ gehörende Quantil einer Verteilungsfunktion interpretieren. Der klassische zentrale Student-Test ergibt sich als Spezialfall (F(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5).

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Summary Let {F _,(x);–<<, >0} withF _,(x ₀):=F((x–)/–F(x) a standarized distribution function — the family of admissible distribution functions. The (earlier introduced) generalized noncentralt-test for the hypothesis {PP ₀} withP:=F _,(x ₀) against the alternative {P>P ₀} at level of significance is compared with the corresponding nonparametric test (Binomial test). The relative asymptotic efficiency of thet-test is determined. Both kinds of tests can be interpreted as quantiltests. In caseF(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5 one gets the classical central Student-test.

     

On a clear day you might see an environmental Kuznets curve

We shed some new light on the Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and show how it can be viewed as a particular form of equilibrium relationship, where technology and preference parameters determine the shape of the curve. In contrast to most of the literature on the EKC, we estimate a theoretically consistent model on long-run data (Swedish sulfur emission, covering the period 1900–2002). Furthermore, we test and date structural change. The model suggests four regimes, 1900–1918, 1919–1933, 1934–1967 and 1968–2002, generating four rather different patterns for pollution over time. The policy-conclusions are consonant with Pearce’s general view about the EKC: there is no theoretical presumption that it has an inverted U shape, nor should any country try to “grow out of the environmental problems” without analyzing the benefits and costs of so doing.     

Wealth and sustainable development: the role of David Pearce

Green net national product was thought to be one way of measuring sustainable income. However, David Pearce understood that a better measure of sustainable development was to look at what a generation is leaving in form of capital assets to later generations. In this article, his arguments and insights are highlighted against recent theoretical advances.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Timing of Public Information and Cost Reduction

Received July 31, 2000; revised version received July 18, 2001     

Disequilibrium dynamics in a simple macroeconomic model

The dynamic behavior of a simple macroeconomic disequilibrium model is analyzed in which consumers' changes in money holdings constitute the dynamic link between any two periods. It is shown that, under constant government consumption, a constant production function (no investment), and fixed prices and wages, stationary states of Keynesian unemployment are stable whereas those of repressed inflation are globally unstable. Possibilities of unemployment and output cycles are indicated for fixed wages as well as for some very simple class of wage and price adjustment mechanisms.