The effect of communication in incentive systems—an experimental study

In organizational theory, it is a widely accepted postulate that cooperation among subjects is enforceable. This assumption is essential for the evaluation of two frequently discussed incentive systems: team and tournament compensation. Whereas in team‐based pay systems cooperation is highly desired, cooperation in rank‐order tournaments—labeled as ‘collusion’—is regarded as one of the main drawbacks of relative performance evaluation. In this experimental study, two different communication technologies are introduced into both incentive environments. The results indicate that when only limited communication is permitted subjects tend to cheat on each other in the tournament rather than in the team setting. Interestingly, allowing subjects to exchange emails leads to a similarly stable cooperation in both incentive systems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.     

Patterns of business creation,survival and growth: Evidence from Africa

We study firm dynamics using a novel database of all formally registered firms in Cote d'Ivoire from 1977 to 1997, which account for about 60% of GDP. First, we examine entry and exit patterns and the role of new and exiting firms versus incumbents in job creation and destruction. We find that while the rate of job creation at new firms is quiet high – at 8% on average – the numbers of jobs added by new firms is small in absolute terms. Next, we examine survival rates and find that the probability of survival increases monotonically with firm size, but that manufacturing and foreign-owned firms face higher likelihoods of exit compared to service oriented and domestically-owned firms. We find that higher GDP growth increases the probability of firm survival, but this is a broad impact with no firm size disproportionately affected. In robustness checks we find that post-1987, size is no longer a significant determinant of firm survival for new entrants, suggesting that the operating environment for firms changed. Finally, we find that trade and fiscal reform episodes raised the probability of firm exit and attenuated the survival disadvantages faced by smaller firms, but exchange rate revaluation and pro-private sector reforms did not significantly lower the likelihood of exit.     

Liquidity, analysts, and institutional ownership

In this paper, we investigate the empirical relationship between institutional ownership, number of analysts following and stock market liquidity. We find that firms with larger number of financial analysts following have wider spreads, lower market quality index, and larger price impact of trades. However, we find that firms with higher institutional ownership have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, and smaller price impact of trades. In addition, we show that changes in our liquidity measures are significantly related to changes in institutional ownership over time. These results suggest that firms may alleviate information asymmetry and improve stock market liquidity by increasing institutional ownership. Our results are remarkably robust to different measures of liquidity and measures of information asymmetry.     

The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

The gender wage gap in Austria: eppur si muove!

We examine the change of the gender wage gap in Austria between 2002 and 2007 using Juhn et al. (Workers and their wages, AEI Press, Washington DC, pp 107–143, 1991) decomposition. We analyze data from Austrian tax records which we merge with social security records and Austrian micro-censuses of the years 2002 and 2007. We find that the gender wage gap declined from 21 % in 2002 to 18 % in 2007. The main determinant of this decline is the relative improvement of women’s unobserved characteristics. The decline of the gender wage gap is also due to women having attained more formal education and to a convergence of men’s and women’s returns to education. Women’s improved educational attainments were partly offset by a shift in the demand for skilled workers that disadvantaged unskilled workers, most of whom are women, resulting in a moderate decrease of the gender pay gap over these years. Robustness checks confirm our results.     

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN UNDERGRADUATE INSURANCE EDUCATION: ACADEMIC AND REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Abstract: The authors discuss the hiring patterns of some insurers and examine why insurers do not always seek out students with risk management and insurance backgrounds. The authors suggest that it is important for universities and insurers to work more closely so that students coming out of college insurance programs are well prepared to work in the insurance industry.