Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.     

Economic Performance, Trade Restrictiveness, and Efficiency

The paper addresses the question of whether trade restrictiveness impacts economic performance, via a trade restrictiveness index that is decomposable into a trade distortion and a domestic distortion component. The paper builds on the Anderson and Neary price index measure of trade distortion, in evaluating trade restrictiveness via a distance function approach. This is accomplished by adding a “dual” version to their trade restrictiveness price index, based on distance functions that scale output quantities. The authors compute the trade restrictiveness quantity index (TRQI) using a parametric frontier approach to model the production side of the economy, and a panel of information on the agricultural sector of a set of European Community countries. The results suggest that the use of TRQI makes a considerable difference to interpretations of the efficiency impact of agricultural trade policies in EC countries, as compared to policy‐oriented aggregates or result‐oriented measures of trade restrictiveness.     

Unexpected windfalls,education, and mental health: evidence from lottery winners in Germany

This paper investigates the causal impact of large unexpected windfalls on individual mental health, physical health, as well as health behaviors. I use a large individual-level panel data set of lottery winners from Germany between the years 2000 and 2011 and observe lottery winners before and after winning a large lottery prize. Mental health declines immediately after winning a large lottery prize for individuals with low education and low levels of financial literacy. While these individuals report being happier after winning the lottery, evidence from commonly used SF-12 measures of mental health indicates that winners with low education experience increased role limitations due to emotional problems, are more anxious, and have less energy after their win. The impact on various measures of mental health is highly robust, statistically significant, economically significant, and persists for up to two years after the win. Unexpected windfalls have no impact on the mental health of individuals with high education or high financial literacy. Winning the lottery has no impact on individuals’ health behaviors such as smoking or alcohol consumption, and it has no impact on doctor visits, hospital stays, or illness-related work absences regardless of education level.     

Persistence of Shocks to Output in Austria and Theories of Economic Growth

The paper analyzes the degree of output persistence in GDP in order toempirically discriminate between the Solow growth model, the perfect competition endogenous growth model and the imperfect competition endogenous growth model for the case of Austria. Wefind that a shock in the growth rate of output induces a permanent and larger effect on the level of GDP. This leads us to refute the Solow growth model and the perfect competition model of endogenous growth.We may not reject the imperfect competition growth model.     

Decreasing absolute prudence: Characterization and applications to second-best risk sharing

In this paper, we provide two basic properties of utility functions u which exhibit decreasing absolute prudence i.e. (− u/u″)′ ≤ 0. These properties are used to examine the allocation of risks in an economy when some agents bear non-transferable risks. We show that it is fair Pareto-efficient to let those with a non-transferable risk bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy if and only if absolute prudence is decreasing. In another model, there is a complete set of contingent markets, but some agents have no direct access to them. We examine the fair efficient allocation of risk in a pool gathering a trader and a non-trader. Decreasing absolute prudence provides an upper bound to the share of the pool's risk that should be borne by the trader.     

Investment Decisions,Financial Flows,and Self‐Enforcing Contracts*

This article studies the role of risk sharing in dynamic credit relationships that are secured by physical collateral. It is shown that, when borrowers and lenders cannot commit not to terminate relationships (through default in the first case and liquidation in the second), overinvestment is optimal. Overinvestment facilitates risk sharing in this context: It occurs in expectation of periods in which lenders are unwilling to supply all the funds necessary to achieve complete risk sharing. Typically, overinvestment happens when investment decreases; it slows down the pace at which the capital stock is reduced and therefore results in production smoothing.