The empire strikes back: Adam Smith,John Stuart Mill,and the Robust Political Economy of empire

Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought, we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so, we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy, which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so, we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.     

Preference-directed regulation when ethical environmental policy choices are formed with limited information

Preference-directed regulation (PDR) can supplement traditional environmental policies through frequent regulatory revision (Livermore, Va Environ Law J 25:311–386, 2007). Using original survey data, PDR is operationalized via counterfactual simulations within a limited information discrete choice model. Augmenting individual opinions about one of the three policies at driving environmental outcomes, stakeholders can induce preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. The three policies are summarized as: (1) ban; (2) tax; and (3) label. The resulting substitution patterns demonstrate that the extent of preference switching between policies depends on the relative change in individual opinions about a policy. Furthermore, different forms of PDR may be more effective at inducing preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy.     

Bounding the benefits of stochastic auditing: The case of risk-neutral agents

Summary. In the context of a costly-state-verification model with a risk-neutral agent having limited liability, it has been postulated that allowing stochastic auditing reduces the asymmetric information problem to a trivial one: i.e., the first best can be approached arbitrarily closely with feasible contracts. This paper proves the postulate to be false: the surplus from feasible contracts is bounded strictly below the first-best surplus level. The bound is straightforward to compute in examples. The paper thus removes a justification for the restriction to deterministic auditing commonly made in the literature. Received: July 18, 1997; revised version: February 23, 1998     

First-author conditions: evidence from finance journal coauthorship

We study the trend and the author name-ordering rule in finance publication using the publication records of 21 core finance journals during the period from 1990 to 2004. We empirically model the underlying factors that affect the alphabetical ordering rule among multi-authored finance articles. We find that the choice of alphabetical ordering is based on the quality of the article, institutional heterogeneity, team size and cultural factors. The central argument rests upon the need to signal and the importance of signalling within the context of bargaining behaviour among coauthors. The probability of choosing alphabetical name ordering rule is associated with high article quality, higher ranked institutions, smaller research team and the presence of European authors.