The emerging aversion to inequality

This paper provides evidence of the changing attitudes to inequality during transition to the market in Poland. Using repeated cross-sections of the population, it identifies a structural break in the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction. Whereas in the first stage of the transition process, an increase in income inequality was interpreted by the population as a positive signal of wider opportunities, later in the transition period increased inequality became a factor in dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation. This was accompanied by increasing public sentiment that the process of income distribution is flawed and corrupt.     

The Dawn of the AI Robots: Towards a New Framework of AI Robot Accountability

Journal of Business Ethics - Business, management, and business ethics literature pay little attention to the topic of AI robots. The broad spectrum of potential ethical issues pertains to using...     

The geometry of optimal taxation: a primal approach

We characterize zero tax results geometrically as a condition on indifference curves and the implementability constraint. The condition can also be expressed as a generalized homotheticity condition on the utility function and also extends older results on uniform taxation that use the duality approach. Many zero taxation results in dynamic macroeconomics can be derived from our characterization; thus it provides a unified framework for a systematic study of these phenomena. Our geometric method also allows to study the sign of deviations from zero tax results in more complicated frameworks such as taxation without commitment.      

Incentives in merchant empires: Portuguese and Dutch compensation schemes

The Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires had a similar geographic distribution with outposts all around the Indian Ocean, which they controlled and manned. Both empires faced the same problem of monitoring their agents in remote corners of the world. Each, however, arrived at a different solution to the monitoring problem. I use a principal–agent model to link different monitoring options to the different organizational structures of the two empires. I further investigate the implications of the model with archival data on labor compensation for Portuguese and Dutch workers overseas.