In Search of the Fourth Way: A Commentary on the Books by Fred Argy and Mark Latham

This paper is a critique of the new books by Mark Latham and Fred Argy, the first of which in particular is said to herald the 'Third Way' in Australian politics. It considers the implications for new policies of economic power and the redefinition of economic welfare, and concludes that if this is the Third Way then we are in need of a Fourth Way.     

Can we improve the perceived quality of economic forecasts?

A number of topics are discussed concerning how economic forecasts can be improved in quality or at least in presentation. These include the following: using 50% uncertainty intervals rather than 95%; noting that even though forecasters use many different techniques, they are all occasionally incorrect in the same direction; that there is a tendency to underestimate changes; that some expectations and recently available data are used insufficiently; lagged forecasts errors can help compensate for structural breaks; series that are more forecastable could be emphasized and that present methods of evaluating forecasts do not capture the useful properties of some methods compared to alternatives.     

The transformational model of social activity and economic analysis: a reinterpretation of the work of J.R. Commons

The work of J.R. Commons, I want to argue, bears a close relationship to, is clarified by and informs, recent developments in social theory. Specifically, recent developments in social theory, elaborated under the heading of critical realism, serve to organize or systematize Commons' work in such a way as to defend it against the commonly made criticisms of incoherence and irrelevance to more general or theoretical concerns. On the other hand Commons' work, based as it is upon practical case study and intervention, serves both to extend or ‘deepen’ existing critical realist accounts and demonstrate their relevance for political economy.     

Polarities between Naturalism and Non-Naturalism in Contemporary Economics: An Overview

We provide a dynamic model of banking competition, in which bounded rationality of some competitors explains how the credit cycle is intensified. We model the economic cycle following Tobias F. Rötheli (2012b), who argues that boundedly rational banks, in their Bayesian learning, overestimate the probability of success during booms and underestimate it during recessions. We obtain three main results. First, the model suggests that pessimism/underconfidence is not a powerful driver of credit cycles. Instead, it supports the conclusion that it is euphoria during large upswings that leads to the next crunch. Second, the dynamization of the model provides further insight into the way boundedly rational competition intensifies the credit cycle. Third, it additionally predicts that the effects of behavioral biases are more pervasive when the quality of the niche markets is lower.     

Enhanced job satisfaction under tighter technological control: The paradoxical outcomes of digitalisation

Via a multiple case study of work in microfinance institutions in India, this paper reports on the experiences of field officers and branch managers following work digitalisation. It identifies and explains an intriguing post-digitalisation paradox of reported increased job satisfaction and tighter technological control diminishing branch managers' work-life balance. The paradox draws attention to the significance of context in workers' experiences of mobile digital technologies (MDTs) and contradicts previous studies on workers' positive experiences of adopting MDTs: the workers in this study did not experience greater autonomy or flexibility but reported enhanced employment security and status. The paper also adds to literature on employment relations following work digitalisation by revealing powerful enforcement of technological control, with ‘WhatsApp’ identified as a key managerial tool used for surveillance and discipline, and worker resistance at the margins.     

Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay

This paper endogenises the internal organisation of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework. The options are monitored teams, unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay, and self-employment. The choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output. As more people opt for self employment, pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and Pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise. The conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive and everyone may gain from policies limiting monitoring and self employment and from the imposition of entry taxes.     

A collective,undifferentiated accounting profession: an Australian study

A study of 386 potential and current members of the accounting profession in Australia and South‐East Asia provides evidence of the importance of three attributes – brand/reputation, international recognition of qualifications and career opportunities – in the decision to join a professional accounting body. While these attributes are important, logit regression models indicate that they are not discriminatory in the choice of professional body and suggest a perception of a collective, undifferentiated accounting profession. The marketing of brand/reputation and membership benefits may be a more efficient and effective strategy in attracting members and differentiating the profession if undertaken by a combined or coordinated professional body.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Accounting and Finance: authorship and citation trends

Accounting and Finance (A&F ) has experienced a surge in published research in the last decade. The analysis here reveals a marked increase in the number of published articles in A&F since 2003, a distinct trend for published papers to have a larger number of authors, a significant and stable contribution by the top 5 Australian accounting/finance departments, as well as a notable increase in contribution from non‐US foreign universities, particularly those located in the UK, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Spain. An analysis of citations indicates the increasing impact of A&F in recent years.     

Precision in auditing standards: effects on auditor and director liability and the supply and demand for audit services

Theoretical research suggests that large auditors have more incentive to issue accurate reports compared to small auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). Controlling for the client characteristics of large and small auditors, this paper shows that large auditors issue reports that are more accurate and more informative signals of financial distress. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between auditor size and auditor accuracy.