Le risque liéà la vérification envisagé dans le contexte du portefeuille de clients*

Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur la question du portefeuille d'un vérificateur qui contrôle le volume de travail de vérification qu'il accepte et combine ensuite ses placements sur le marché boursier en général à ses placements dans des missions de vérification présentant un risque. Il est impossible pour le vérificateur, font-ils remarquer, de sélectionner les missions de vérification qu'il désire incorporer à son portefeuille; un portefeuille se constitue plutôt indirectement, par l'intermédiaire d'un processus d'offres de service concurrentielles. L'analyse qui suit permet donc de formuler une fonction d'offre gráce à laquelle il est possible d'estimer les honoraires minimums que le vérificateur est disposé à accepter pour dispenser ses services à un nouveau client potentiel, étant donné ses placements existants. Les auteurs énoncent des propositions relatives aux conséquences de diverses caractéristiques du portefeuille sur les honoraires demandés. Enfin, ils traitent de l'incidence possible du risque lié à la vérification, envisagé dans l'optique du portefeuille, sur la structure du secteur de la vérification.     

‘Knowledge Preservation in Accounting’: Does It Deserve to Be Preserved?

This is my third in a series of critical pieces on the accounting education field. The first, ‘What Accounting Can Learn from Legal Education’, was published in Issues in Accounting Education (Fall 1987) and dealt with the problems resulting from teaching accounting as a science. The second, ‘Wisdom or Widgets: Whither the School of Business?’ (Abacus, September 1988) dealt with the price we pay in our research for our obsession with quantitative methods. The current piece evaluates Robert Bricker's 1988 article in this journal.     

The Effectiveness of OSHA Penalties: A Stock-Market-Based Test

This study examines shareholder reactions to the announcements of OSHA penalties in the press over the years 1979-89. The analysis demonstrates that investors react negatively to the announced sanctions over the time interval immediately surrounding the announcement day. The decreases in the values of the subject firms are, however, found to be unrelated to the relative size of the penalty, to the number of non-record-keeping violations, and to whether the penalties were attributable to employee injury or death. The findings suggest that for the stockholders the nature of the announced OSHA sanctions is largely irrelevant, and they further point toward a reassessment of the assumed deterrent impact of the penalities.     

Equity Valuation Effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006*

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability) and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds, and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms’ abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of ?4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different “at risk” categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.     

Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Workers in a wide variety of jobs are paid based on performance, which is commonly seen as enhancing effort and productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can, in some cases, result in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments in the U.S. and in India in which subjects worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to very large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, very high reward levels had a detrimental effect on performance.     

Do Earnings Targets and Managerial Incentives Affect Sticky Costs?

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.     

新农村建设背景下白裤瑶开展传统体育文化活动的调查与分析

以广西河池市南丹县里湖乡的300多名白裤瑶群众为研究对象,对白裤瑶群众参与体育健身活动现状进行调查与分析,并提出在新农村建设背景下白裤瑶地区进一步发展体育文化活动的建议和对策.