THE EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF RENT‐SEEKING COSTS

Abstract This survey focuses on the efforts, carried out mainly by public choice scholars, to measure the social cost of rent seeking. The concept, introduced by Gordon Tullock in 1967 and coined by Anne Krueger in 1974, is well known and accepted by the profession, but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation, an often criticized lack in the literature. Although there are good general surveys, none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon. The purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey.     

Ecosystem Service Value and Agricultural Conversion in the Amazon: Implications for Policy Intervention

We explore the welfare implications of agricultural expansion in the Brazilian Amazon by comparing spatially explicit estimates of soybean rents and the value of ecosystem services. Although these estimates are generated from different datasets, models, and estimation techniques, the values are comparable, such that the value of ecosystem services is greater than soybean rents for about 61% of the total area and 24% of the area where soybean rents are positive if protected areas are well enforced. Based on the balance between the benefits and costs of conversion, failure to value ecosystem services reduces total social welfare by 7.13 billion dollars annually relative to an optimum. Policy instruments that internalize the value of ecosystem services via protected lands, land conversion taxes, conservation subsidies, or excise taxes can avoid much of this loss. Regardless of intervention regime, policy makers should be cognizant of the diminishing net benefits of converting natural ecosystems to agriculture. Realizing the final 3.8% requires the conversion of an additional 15% natural ecosystems to soybean production.     

The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way.We discuss possible adverse effects of whistle-blowing programs on firms' behavior, and particularly on turnover, incentives to innovate and cooperation. We also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.     

What Enhances Insider Trading Profitability?

This study analyses the factors triggering insider trading profitability. Since there is not much evidence on this topic in the continental-European context, we focus on the Spanish stock market. Our findings show that the main relevant factors (the timing ability of the insider, the transparency of the transaction and the level of free cash flow of the firm) are related to insiders’ opportunities behaviour, motivated by the lack of either managerial control within the firm or enforcement of insider trading regulation. The level of ownership concentration, the spread and the interaction between the size and the transparency of the transaction are other relevant factors, some of them tested for the first time in the insider trading literature.      

The Euro and International Equity Flows

We use a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross-border equity flows between 14 countries. We fit a “gravity model” to these data and a strictly comparable set of data for manufactures trade between these countries. The results are strikingly similar, although the coefficient on the distance variable is lower for equity than for trade flows (but still highly significant). We use the results to throw some light on the likely consequences of unifying the European equity markets.J. Japan. Int. Econ.December 1998,12(4), pp. 406–423. London Business School and CEPR, Sussex Place, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom and London School of Economics, London WC2 2AE, United Kingdom.Copyright 1998 Academic Press.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers F21, F3.     

Peer group influences on children’s product preferences

In contrast to earlier studies using adult subjects, this experiment with first graders did not f’md a high degree of brand loyalty development in response to a minimally differentiated product. In fact, while some brand preferences did develop, most subjects appeared to seek some degree of variety in their choices. It is interesting to speculate that children have a “greater need for novelty” than adults and are thus less likely to develop brand loyalty. However, extensive research will be required to remove this proposition from the realm of speculation.     

Competitive cross‐subsidization

Cross‐subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co‐opetition, as they offer substitutes for one‐stop shoppers and complements for multi‐stop shoppers. When intense competition for one‐stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below‐cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one‐stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below‐cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.     

On the properties of high-order non-monetary measures for risks

This paper investigates how welfare losses for facing high-order risk increases change when the risk environment of the decision maker is altered. To that aim, we define the nth-order utility premium as a measure of pain associated with facing the passage of one risk to a more severe one and we examine some of its properties. Changes in risk are expressed through the concept of stochastic dominance of order n. The paper investigates more particularly welfare changes of merging increases in risk, first ignoring background risks, then taking them into account. Merging increases in risk may be beneficial or not, depending on whether background risks are considered and how. The paper also provides conditions on individual preferences for superadditivity of the nth-order utility premium. The results confirm the importance and usefulness of two analytical concepts: mixed risk aversion and risk apportionment.