Are you really doing good things in your boss's eyes? Interactive effects of employee innovative work behavior and leader–member exchange on supervisory performance ratings

Organizations increasingly depend on employee efforts to innovate. However, the quality of relationships between leaders and employees may affect the recognition that employees receive for their innovative work behaviors. Drawing from a social cognition perspective, we tested a model in which leader–member exchange (LMX) moderates the impact of employee innovative work behavior on supervisory ratings of employee performance. Results from two multisource studies combining self, colleague, and supervisor ratings consistently showed that employees receive more favorable performance ratings by engaging in innovative work behavior when they have high‐quality LMX relationships. Moreover, we found that this interactive relationship was mediated by leader perceptions of innovative employee efforts, providing support for a moderated mediation model. Implications for the literatures on performance appraisal, LMX, and innovation are discussed.     

Forecasting interest rates with shifting endpoints

We consider forecasting the term structure of interest rates with the assumption that factors driving the yield curve are stationary around a slowly time‐varying mean or ‘shifting endpoint’. The shifting endpoints are captured using either (i) time series methods (exponential smoothing) or (ii) long‐range survey forecasts of either interest rates or inflation and output growth, or (iii) exponentially smoothed realizations of these macro variables. Allowing for shifting endpoints in yield curve factors provides substantial and significant gains in out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy, relative to stationary and random walk benchmarks. Forecast improvements are largest for long‐maturity interest rates and for long‐horizon forecasts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Customer loyalty: Toward an integrated conceptual framework

Customer loyalty is viewed as the strength of the relationship between an individual’s relative attitude and repeat patronage. The relationship is seen as mediated by social norms and situational factors. Cognitive, affective, and conative antecedents of relative attitude are identified as contributing to loyalty, along with motivational, perceptual, and behavioral consequences. Implications for research and for the management of loyalty are derived. His research interests include consumer decision making, information processing, and consumer loyalty. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research andAdvances in Consumer Research. His research interests are consumer information processing, persuasion cues in advertising, and international marketing. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Consumer Psychology, andCanadian Journal of Administrative Sciences as well as in a number of conference proceedings.     

中国制造的创意运动

在上世纪50年代的美国，如果你想推销产品，就要通过电视去做：早年香烟公司尤其热衷于这个新媒体，有时会获得令人惊奇的成果：国际香烟品牌“Old Gold”的广告就用了这样的一个广告：“Old Gold”牌长腿版香烟包装在布幕前翩翩起舞，再配上配音员的吟诵：“由香烟人制造，不是医生？”这当然是因为没有人想他们的香烟是由医生制造的!     

BIG QUESTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN1

The conventional story of Australian economic history is worth challenging. Rather than just assuming a national economy with conventional turning points such as Federation, economic historians would do well to investigate more complex processes like the interplay between regions, races and development, and the changing patterns of interaction with the outside world. The big question for economic historians is whether in the future they can undertake economic research which informs history and so contributes to the national debate.     

The scope for collusion under fractional defections

This paper examines the scope for firms to collude in an oligopoly supergame, when firms defect by producing a fraction of their best response outputs. Such deviations from the collusive equilibrium are termed fractional defections. We show that the joint profit maximizing output level cannot be sustained under fractional defections and identify the most collusive output level. The paper also investigates the ability of firms to collude as both demand and the number of firms in the industry vary. The results reveal that the degree of collusion is inversely related to the level of demand and that high levels of concentration may in fact be inimical to collusion.     

Opportunity,fair process and relationship value: career development as a driver of proactive work behaviour

In line with recent findings from organisational justice theory, we hypothesised that employee proactive behaviour and careerist orientation is predicted by the interplay of perceived favourability of career development opportunities, the perceived fairness of the procedures used to decide them, and employee organisational commitment. Employees (N = 325) of a large financial services organisation responded to a self‐completion questionnaire. As predicted, when career development opportunities were viewed unfavourably, perceived procedural justice was significantly and positively related to individual proactive behaviour and significantly and negatively related to careerist orientation but only when organisational commitment was high. It appears that high procedural justice may only ‘offset’ the negative effects of unfavourable career development opportunities when employees identify with, and are committed to, their organisation. Further support is presented for a relational, rather than instrumental, model of procedural justice when reflecting on employee reactions to their employers’ policies and decision‐making. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame

This paper explores the impact of debt holdings on the output decisions of firms in an oligopoly supergame with stochastic demand fluctuations. It is demonstrated that when perfect collusion is not feasible then there exist circumstances in which increased debt holdings may facilitate tacit collusion. This occurs because higher debt levels act as a credible commitment device which lowers the payoffs accruing to a firm when it defects from the tacitly collusive equilibrium. It is further shown that in these circumstances firms may have an incentive to hold debt for strategic purposes which promote collusion.