Iterative Adjustment of Survival Functions by Composed Probability Distortions

We introduce a parametric class of composite probability distortions that can be combined to converge to a target survival function. These distortions respect analytic invertibility and stability, which are shown to be relevant in many actuarial fields. We study the asymptotic impact of such distortions on hazard rates. The paper provides an estimation methodology, including hints for initialisation. Some applications to survival data bring results for catastrophic event impact modelling. We also obtain accurate parametric representations of the mortality trend over years. Finally, we suggest a prospective mortality simulation model that comes naturally from the above analysis.     

Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information

We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step‐function, regular and semi‐regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi‐regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi‐regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step‐function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient.     

Buying Back Subcontractors: The Strategic Limits of Backward Integration

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its n subcontractors the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we show that backward integration is limited by a strategic negative effect: the prices and profits of independent suppliers increase when a merger reduces their number. Mergers are profitable only if the downstream firm buys at least two thirds of its suppliers. In an endogenous acquisition game à la Kamien and Zang (1990) the only merged equilibrium occurs when there is only one subcontractor. In a sequential acquisition game full integration is not an equilibrium when the number of suppliers is at least five.     

Trade and the location of industries: Some new results

We study a two-country two-sector model with free entry and monopolistic competition where both industries use labour to produce differentiated goods. The two countries are identical except for size. Labour is freely mobile across industries but it cannot move internationally. Transport costs affect both industries. The location of industries and the pattern of trade are the results of the interaction of two effects: the home market effect and the wage differential effect. The main results are: (i) if the two countries are sufficiently close in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), a continuous fall in transport costs from a prohibitive level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some intermediate level. For large transport costs, the large country is a net exporter of the more differentiated good. For lower transport costs, the large country becomes a net exporter of the less differentiated good; (ii) if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), the larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good.     

Flexible Contracts and Human Capital Investments

As suggested by human capital theory, workers with flexible contracts participate less often in training than those with permanent contracts. We find that this is merely due to the fact that flexworkers receive less employer-funded training, a gap they can only partly compensate for by their own training investments. Flexworkers particularly participate less in firm-specific training that is meant to keep up with new skill demands than workers with permanent contracts. However, for those who participate in employer-funded firm-specific training, a temporary contract appears to facilitate the transition to a permanent contract with the same employer. However, this does not hold for participation in self-paid training. This training, which is usually general training, does not help in finding a better job.     

Consumer satisfaction and loyalty: Two main consequences of retailer personality

This article investigates the impact of retailer personality on consumers' satisfaction with and loyalty to the retailer, measured through attitude and future behavioral intentions. Data were collected on a convenience sample of 372 customers of a specific retailer. Using partial least squares analysis (PLS), we show that four traits (“congeniality”, “originality”, “conscientiousness” and “preciousness”) have a direct or indirect impact on one of the dependent variables studied. Hence, this article proposes a model of the consequences of retailer personality and suggests that retailer personality is an important concept that practitioners should consider when running their satisfaction and loyalty programs.     

Municipal support of wireless access network rollout: A game theoretic approach

Next generation access networks are expected to bring ubiquitous broadband access and have attracted interest of municipal governments. This paper investigates the support by municipal authorities for the rollout of such a city-wide wireless broadband access network. Different business cases for 3G and WiFi operators are developed and it is indicated how to model the specificities for commercial versus public players. Furthermore, a game theoretic approach is used to investigate the investment options of the municipal player. It is shown that a partnership between a commercial and public player is the most likely investment strategy. However, bringing more players into the competitive environment reduces the intention of the commercial partner to engage in the public–private partnership (PPP).     

Intermarket network externalities and competition: An application to the media industry

Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two-sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets.     

Measuring consumer's willingness to pay for organic and Fair Trade products

Previous research has extensively studied consumer's environmental and social concerns. However, measuring the value of the environmental or social dimension of a product remains a challenge. This paper proposes to partially fill this gap by measuring the double ‘Fair Trade and organic’ labels' value using an experimental method – the Becker‐DeGroot‐Marschak's mechanism. Two ‘organic and Fair Trade’ and two conventional chocolate products were tested on a sample of 102 consumers. Results show that organic and Fair Trade labels increase consumers' willingness to pay, and allow the identification of three consumers clusters. The first cluster represents people insensitive to the label. For the second cluster, the ‘organic and Fair Trade’ labels' influence on the improving image of the products is positive and important. And finally, for the third cluster, the valuation of the ‘organic and Fair Trade’ label is determined by the product's taste. Our research contributes to a better understanding of consumers' valuation of Fair Trade and organic labels, leading to our conclusions, which offer managerial implications with respect to this market (importance of taste and usefulness of double labels).