The Effect of the Hedge Horizon on Optimal Hedge Size and Effectiveness When Prices are Cointegrated

This study compares two alternative regression specifications for sizing hedge positions and measuring hedge effectiveness: a simple regression on price changes and an error correction model (ECM). We show that, when the prices of the hedged item and the hedging instrument are cointegrated, both specifications yield similar results which depend on the hedge horizon (i.e., the time frame for measuring price changes). In particular, the estimated hedge ratio and regression R² will both be small when price changes are measured over short intervals, but as the hedge horizon is lengthened both measures will converge toward one. These results imply that, when prices are cointegrated, a longer hedge horizon will yield an optimal hedge ratio closer to one, while at the same time enhancing the ability to qualify for hedge accounting. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 32:837–876, 2012     

Local institutions: Regulation and valuation of forest use—Evidence from Central Sulawesi,Indonesia

Forest management poses particular challenges as the pressure on forests is huge due to deforestation. In this context, the establishment of protected areas is a common conservation measure where institutions are put in place and sanctions regarding forest use are enforced. This paper focuses on the practice of sustainable forest management and the associated perspectives of local institutions at the rainforest margins of Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP) in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.     

Das Wiederholungsparadoxon

In this paper we discuss how repetition of a single statement affects its perceived credibility. Using an experimental design, our results support previous psychological studies on the “truth-effect”, which have shown that repeated messages are considered more credible than non-repeated messages. In addition, our study sheds light on the unanswered question why the truth-effect vanishes or reverses if statements are repeated too often. Analysis strongly points to a parallel, indirect negative effect, caused by participants showing reactance as a consequence of repetition.     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Goals are an important motivator. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts. First, goals serve as reference points for performance. Second, present‐biased preferences create self‐control problems. We show the power and limits of self‐regulation through goals. Goals increase an individual's motivation—but only up to a certain point. Furthermore, they are painful self‐disciplining devices. Thus, greater self‐control problems may result in tougher goals; but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force, or are too painful to be accepted.