Can countries rely on foreign saving for investment and economic development?

Contrary to widespread presumption, a surprisingly large number of countries have been able to finance a significant fraction of their investment for extended periods using foreign finance. While many of these episodes are in countries where official finance is important, we also identify episodes where a substantial fraction of domestic investment is financed by private capital inflows. Although there is evidence of a positive growth effect of such inflows in the short run, that positive impact dissipates after 5 years and turns negative over longer horizons. Many such episodes end abruptly, with compression of the current account and sharp slowdowns in investment and growth. Summing over the inflow (current account deficit) episode and its aftermath, we find that growth is slower than when countries rely on domestic savings. The implication is that financing growth and investment out of foreign savings, while not impossible, is risky and too often counterproductive.     

Mars or Mercury redux: The geopolitics of bilateral trade agreements

We analyse the role of economic and security considerations in bilateral trade agreements. We use the pre‐World War I period to test whether trade agreements are governed by standard gravity variables, or by instead—or in addition—geopolitical factors. While we like others find support for standard gravity variables, we also find that defence pacts boost the probability of trade agreements by as much as 20 percentage points. Our estimates imply that were the U.S. to alienate its geopolitical allies, the likelihood and benefits of successful bilateral agreements would fall significantly. Trade creation from an agreement between the U.S. and E.U. countries would decline by about 0.6 per cent of total U.S. exports.     

The correlates of international financial‐center status

We consider the correlates of international financial‐center status. Our estimates point to the flexibility, transparency, and stability of the economic and social environment as determinants of financial center‐status. They point also to roles for monetary and financial stability, financial openness, financial scale and development, technology and size of government. We draw out the implications of this analysis for the future prospects of actual and aspiring international financial centers such as London, New York, and Shanghai.     

Two Views of the International Monetary System

Intereconomics - Distinguishing between two different schools of thought that are named after two different universities, Harvard and Berkeley, the article looks at the evolution, past and future,...     

Solving the Currency Conundrum

This paper reviews the prospects for the exchange rate system in different parts of the world. It discounts radical changes like a single world currency and a trio of regional monetary unions: in Europe, where intergration is political as well as economic and financial, the euro should provide the basis for an expanding zone of monetary stability; in the Americas, in contrast, dollarization is likely to be the solution for countries with strong financial links to the USA that find it difficult to run an autonomous monetary policy; and in Asia, continued floating is the only plausible outcome, given the obstacles to the alternatives.
(J.E.L.: F3)     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Rise of the Dollar as an International Currency, 1914–1939

This paper provides new evidence on the rise of the dollar as an international currency, focusing on its role in the conduct of trade and the provision of trade credit. We show that the shift to the dollar occurred much earlier than conventionally supposed: during and immediately after World War I. Not just market forces but also policy support—the Fed in its role as market maker—was important for the dollar’s overtaking of sterling as the leading international currency. On balance, this experience challenges the popular notion of international currency status as being determined mainly by market size. It suggests that the popular image of strongly increasing returns and pervasive network externalities leaving room for only one monetary technology is misleading.     

Institutions for Fiscal Stability

This paper reviews the controversy over Europe's Stability andGrowth Pact and offers a proposal for its reform. It arguesthat Europe would be best served by focusing on the fundamentalcauses of unsustainable debts — public enterprises thatare too big to fail, unfunded public pension schemes that aretoo big to ignore, inefficient and costly labor market and socialwelfare problems, and budget making institutions that createcommon pool and free-rider problems — rather than on arbitrarynumerical indicators like whether the budget deficit is aboveor below 3 percent of GDP. It proposes defining an index ofinstitutional reform with, say, a point each for reform of budgetmaking arrangements, reform of public pension schemes, and reformof labor markets and unemployment insurance. Countries receivingthree points would be exempt from the Pact's numerical guidelines,since there is no reason to think that they will be prone tochronic deficits. The others, whose weak institutions renderthem susceptible to chronic deficits, would in contrast stillbe subject to its warnings, sanctions and fines.(JEL E0, F4)