Past experience of uncertainty affects risk aversion

In an experiment with more than 500 participants we study how past experience of uncertainty (imperfect knowledge of the state space) affects risk preferences. Participants in our experiment choose between a sure outcome and a lottery in 32 periods. All treatments are exactly identical in periods 17–32 but differ in periods 1–16. In the early periods of the risk treatment there is perfect information about the lottery; in the ambiguity Treatment participants perfectly know the outcome space but not the associated probabilities; in the unawareness treatment participants have imperfect knowledge about both outcomes and probabilities. We observe strong treatment effects on behavior in periods 17–32. In particular, participants who have been exposed to an environment with very imperfect knowledge of the state space subsequently choose lotteries with high (low) variance less (more) often compared to other participants. Estimating individual risk attitudes from choices in periods 17–32 we find that the distribution of risk attitude parameters across our treatments can be ranked in terms of first order stochastic dominance. Our results show how exposure to environments with different degrees of uncertainty can affect individuals’ subsequent risk-taking behavior.     

What drives international financial flows? Politics,institutions and other determinants

This paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending. First, employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed-effects framework, the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance. Second, cross-sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending. Third, instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows. The results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of Lucas [Lucas, Robert E. 1990. “Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 80 (2): 92–96. 1990] paradox of why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries. The analysis also does a first-step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking.     

Natural selection and rational decision: two concepts of optimization

There are two different kinds of optimization: “selection” and “rationality” optimization. Selection optimization characterizes competition in human and nonhuman societies sharing the same market or niche. “Rationality optimization”, on the other hand, characterizes human and nonhuman decision making processes. The two kinds of optimization generate the same result: agents end up behaving efficiently. Nonetheless, we should not downplay the differences between the two kinds of optimization. Otherwise, we would fail to capture the role of rationality in the development of the organism and possibly its implication for evolution.

Tyranny of kindness: Dismantling the welfare system to end poverty in America Theresa Funiciello

The Comment on Wrenn’s article “What is Heterodox Economics?” suggests that the inability of heterodox economists to define their field arises from an as yet unrecognized and different metaphysical foundation than that of orthodox economics.     

Reassessing the empirical validity of the human-capital augmented neoclassical growth model

We reassess Mankiw, Romer and Weil's [mrw] version of the Solow model using, as did mrw, cross-sectional data to estimate the steady-state equation governing income per capita levels. The model fails in two critical areas. First, plausible factor shares obtained by mrw are not robust to the substitution of two measures of human capital that are more precise than the secondary school enrollment rates used by mrw. Second, the null hypothesis of an exogenous and identical level of technology in all countries is rejected. We also explain why the Solow model performed well despite the above shortcomings.     

Survival of the Most Foolish of Fools: The Limits of Evolutionary Selection Theory

The paper investigates whether evolutionary selection, in nature or the market, ensures the survival of rational agents. It argues that once rationality appears, evolutionary selection can account for its diffusion—but cannot account for its appearance in the first place. This issue differs from the investigation of whether history matters. The issue of history or path-dependency focuses on whether evolutionary selection can favor the survival of the potentially most productive apparatus (in the biological or technological sense). To show this, the paper commences with the much-neglected difference between efficiency and productivity. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.