Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

International Trade and Volume Patterns under Quasilinear Preferences

We formally analyze the pattern and volume of trade by embedding quasilinear preferences in the standard perfectly competitive, two‐factor, two‐good, two‐country trade model. Quasilinear preferences deliver a natural partition of the two goods into a luxury and a necessity, and preserve the validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorems. In addition, the predicted factor content of trade under quasilinear preferences is smaller (larger) than the predicted factor content of trade under homothetic preferences if and only if the luxury good is capital (labor) intensive. This result offers a novel explanation for the “missing‐trade” mystery.     

Convolution of uniform distributions and ruin probability

Abstract

This paper presents an “operational calculus” method for evaluating the convolution of uniform distributions and applies it to solve a problem in ruin theory.     

Beyond the Anglo‐Saxon and North European models: social partnership in a Greek textiles company

Much of the literature examining social partnership focuses on either Anglo‐Saxon or North European countries, differentiating between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). These studies argue, quite correctly, that the institutional forces shaping partnership in the two types of economy differ markedly, with the consequence that partnership takes somewhat different forms at the workplace. By contrast, there is only limited research on social partnership in Mediterranean economies—such as Greece—even though there are strong reasons to suggest it may be quite different from both LMEs and CMEs because of relatively recent military influence at state level and less well‐developed systems of industrial relations at organisational level. This article examines the forces operating both at national and at local level that facilitate or hinder the development of social partnership. It is based on the results of interviews with government, industry and union officials and a case study of partnership in a textiles company in northern Greece. It concludes that institutional forces provided workers with more protection than they would have achieved in an LME but that ultimately competitive pressures and a lack of effective workplace representation limited the degree to which the state can influence the processes and outcomes of social partnership at local level.     

The framing of risks and the communication of subjective probabilities for victimizations

What does ??likely?? mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim of crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains (??being spared of offences??) or as losses (??becoming a victim of crime??). Because losses are perceived as more severe, respondents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey. Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency and the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. ??unlikely??) higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for less severe events than for infrequent and for severe events. In conclusion, respondents do not use vague quantifiers consistently so that it is problematic to compare subjective risks for different victimizations.     

Country of Origin Labeling (C.O.O.L.): How cool is it?

This paper develops a partial-equilibrium model of a small open-economy trading an unsafe product. The model is used to analyze the welfare effects of trade with and without a country-of-origin labeling (COOL) program. The welfare gains from trade in the absence of COOL are ambiguous, may justify the imposition of a trade ban. Even if a full ban does not improve welfare and some restriction of trade is always welfare-enhancing. Under a tariff regime, more COOL trade is better than less trade. Independently of domestic market power, free trade coupled with a COOL program maximizes national welfare.