Valuation effects of rollout publicly traded partnerships in the oil and gas industry

In trying to explain the often painful process of corporate restructuring, fingers are frequently pointed at inefficient management. This gives short shrift, however, to an important result of breaking up large, integrated corporations and selling them in smaller pieces: it makes the capital market more nearly complete, and there are strong theoretical arguments that this enhances value. We report the results of a natural experiment that occurred in the oil and gas industry, in which eleven integrated corporations formed publicly traded partnerships to hold their domestic production properties, yet (with few exceptions) retained most of the partnership units under corporate ownership. This behavior avoids any significant change in corporate governance, and is inconsistent with the tax motive popularly attributed as the reason for forming these partnerships; yet we find that significant positive abnormal returns accrued to stockholders when the formations were announced. The results we observe, therefore, support the theory that additional value can be realized by expanding the set of opportunities available to the investment community.     

The valuation of initial public offerings*

Abstract. This paper examines the empirical validity of hypothesized relationships between the initial value of unseasoned common shares and information revealed to outside investors. In addition to the direct accounting disclosures contained in the offering prospectus, the entrepreneur is believed to signal the firm's true value through the proportion of ownership retained in the firm and the selection of prestigious underwriting services. The underwriter, in turn, intermediates in the disclosure of information to investors and applies a fee schedule which provides outsiders with further indications of project quality. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent la validité empirique des relations dont ils posent l'hypothèse entre la valeur des actions ordinaires lors d'une émission initiale et l'information livrée aux investisseurs extérieurs. En plus de l'information comptable directe contenue dans le prospectus d'émission, l'entrepreneur s'attend à ce que le pourcentage de la participation qu'il conserve dans l'entreprise et la sélection de services de prise ferme prestigieux soient des indicateurs de la valeur véritable de l'entreprise. Le preneur ferme, à son tour, joue le rôle d'intermédiaire dans la communication d'information aux investisseurs et applique un barème de frais qui véhicule, aux yeux des investisseurs extérieurs, d'autres indications au sujet de la qualité de l'émission.     

Measuring International Harmonization and Standardization

This paper analyses six recent studies dealing with the measurement of international harmonization of financial reporting. Methodological issues and problems relating to the definition and operationalization of terms, sources of data, statistical methods and causation are discussed, and an alternative methodology for measuring harmonization suggested.     

International Capital Structure Equilibrium

This paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes. We generalize the Miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets. Our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium, and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions. We close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure, the International Fisher Effect, and international tax effects on yield differentials.     

Boekbesprekingen - Reviews

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Hysteresis in economic relationships: An overview

I am grateful for helpful comments to G. Heidbrink, J. Möller, H.J. Ramser, W. Scheremet, and W. Smolny (University of Konstanz).     

Negative earnings,positive earnings and stock return predictability: An empirical examination of market timing

We examine the predictive ability of earnings-price ratios or yields for the S&P 500 index. We decompose the aggregate earnings-price ratio into its positive and negative components (“winners” vs “losers”) and find that the negative component has the most predictive ability. We also find that the earnings-price measures forecast both future returns and earnings growth. Our models display substantial variation in explanatory power over time with forecast power resurfacing in the latter 1990s. We conclude that to the extent that earnings-price yields predict future S&P 500 returns, the negative earnings component is the driving factor.     

Adjoint-based Monte Carlo calibration of financial market models

Adjoint methods have recently gained considerable importance in the finance sector, because they allow to quickly compute option sensitivities with respect to a large number of model parameters. In this paper we investigate how the efficiency of adjoint methods can be exploited to speed up the Monte Carlo-based calibration of financial market models. After analyzing the calibration problem both theoretically and numerically, we derive the associated adjoint equation and propose its application in combination with a multi-layer method, for which we prove convergence to a stationary point of the underlying optimization problem. Detailed numerical examples illustrate the performance of the method. In particular, the proposed algorithm reduces the calibration time for a typical equity market model with time-dependent model parameters from over three hours to less than ten minutes on a usual desktop PC.      

Legal protection of investors,corporate governance,and the cost of equity capital

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance on the cost of equity capital in emerging markets and how the effect is influenced by country-level legal protection of investors. We find that firm-level corporate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital in these markets. In addition, this corporate governance effect is more pronounced in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection. Thus, in emerging markets, firm-level corporate governance and country-level shareholder protection seem to be substitutes for each other in reducing the cost of equity. Our results are consistent with the finding from McKinsey's surveys that institutional investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate governance, especially when the firms are in countries where the legal protection of investors is weak.