Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

Estimating aggregate autoregressive processes when only macro data are available

The aggregation of individual random AR(1) models generally leads to an AR(∞$\infty$) process. We provide two consistent estimators of aggregate dynamics based on either a parametric regression or a minimum distance approach for use when only macro data are available. Notably, both estimators allow us to recover some moments of the cross-sectional distribution of the autoregressive parameter. Both estimators perform very well in our Monte-Carlo experiment, even with finite samples.     

The impact of award uncertainty on settlement negotiations

Legal disputes are often negotiated under the backdrop of an adjudicated award. While settlements are common, they are not universal. In this paper, we empirically explore how uncertainty in adjudicated awards impacts settlement negotiations. To do so, we develop an experimental design to test how increases in variance and positive skewness of the award distribution impact negotiations and settlement rates. We find increases in variance decrease settlement rates, while increases in skewness generally increases settlement rates. We also gather individual measures of risk aversion and prudence, and incorporate these measures into the analysis to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. Overall, our results suggest that highly variable adjudicated awards can contribute to the excess use of inefficient litigation, while more positively skewed awards can reduce the use of inefficient litigation.     

The Socio-scientific Construction of Global Climate Crisis

This article adapts and applies a securitisation framework to produce an analytical explanation for the heightened geopolitical status of climate change over the past decade, as demonstrated by the breakthrough Paris Agreement of 2015. Rather than speech acts invoking security, the focus of this analysis is on the socio-scientific discourse of global climate crisis that emerged in the several year period leading to the 2009 COP 15 conference in Copenhagen. Two types of experts—contributory and interactional—are identified as the essential and interdependent actors that engaged in ‘crisification’, a novel crisis-based perspective on political agenda setting, in which climate crisis served as a primary discursive device employed by prominent advocates of urgent action. Contributory experts, that is, authoritative climate scientists and their institutions, together with interactional experts—non-scientist social actors who appropriated and mediated scientific data and knowledge in framing climate change as a global crisis—constituted an extended epistemic community of climate advocates. Through an array of speech acts, this extended community effectively co-constructed a convincing climate crisis discourse that consisted of quantitative data artefacts based on CO₂ concentration and global mean temperature, and qualitative invocations of existential threat to human civilisation, which contributed to the ascent of climate change on the global political agenda. In proposing crisification as a complement to securitisation, the article offers a theoretical innovation that facilitates constructivist analysis of issues framed as crises, including geopolitical problems in certain non-military sectors where crisis is a favoured label for perceived threats to core values.     

Coordination and learning in games with strategic substitutes and complements

This paper experimentally compares the impact of the presence of strategic substitutes (GSS) and complements (GSC) on players’ ability to successfully play equilibrium strategies. By exploiting a simple property of the ordering on strategy spaces, our design allows us to isolate these effects by avoiding other confounding factors that are present in more complex settings, such as market games. We find that the presence of strategic complementarities significantly improves the rate of Nash play, but that this effect is driven mainly by early rounds of play. This suggests that GSS may be more difficult to learn initially, but that given sufficient time, the theoretically supported globally stable equilibrium offers a good prediction in both settings. We also show that increasing the degree of substitutability or complementarity does not significantly improve the rate of Nash play in either setting, which builds on the findings of previous studies.     

Non-cooperative exploitation of multi-cohort fisheries—The role of gear selectivity in the North-East Arctic cod fishery

North-East Arctic cod is shared by Russia and Norway. Taking its multi-cohort structure into account, how would optimal management look like? How would non-cooperative exploitation limit the obtainable profits? To which extent could the strategic situation explain today’s over-harvesting? Simulation of a detailed bio-economic model reveals that the mesh size should be significantly increased, resulting not only in a doubling of economic gains, but also in a biologically healthier age-structure of the stock. The Nash equilibrium is close to the current regime. Even when effort is fixed to its optimal level, the non-cooperative choice of gear selectivity leads to a large dissipation of rents.     

On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: workers' rents also matter

Abstract .  In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled.     

An evolutionary model of recycling and product lifetime extension

This paper presents a model-based analysis of the development and diffusion of so-called ‘green’ products, i.e. those which are easily recyclable and which have a long lifetime. We address this problem by developing an evolutionary simulation model to identify the impact of the environmental R&D strategies of business firms on the economy and the environment. The simulation results show that R&D investment both in product recyclability and in product lifetime extension can be positive for the firm. Adopting such a strategy means that the firm can then market green products, which provides it with a competitive advantage on firms investing mainly in product recyclability whatever consumers' preferences. From an environmental point of view, the diffusion of green products will reduce both waste flows in the economy and pressure on virgin resources. However, diversifying R&D investment to develop both product recyclability and lifetime can mean slowing down the flow of recycled materials and may lead to even greater quantities of unrecycled waste. Our results suggest introducing regulation policies aiming at encouraging firms to invest both in product recyclability and lifetime in order to benefit from their complementarities. Furthermore, simulations show that it should be better to direct environmental policies on firms' environmental innovation strategies than on demand attributes because significant changes in these strategies would provide much more radical environmental changes.     

互联网信息服务带来改变 消费者确定性、消费者满意度和中国品牌的发展

随着时间的推移,中国的消费者将能够在越来越充分的信息背景下做出消费选择,即使是针对新的、不熟悉的商品。随着时间的推移,制造商会意识到开发质量稳定、品牌知名的优势产品的莫大益处。届时,品牌的价值将大大增加,高质量产品的价格将会上升,劳动力也将得到     

An Ordered-Probit Analysis of Price and Performance in Competitively Tendered Contracts

Abstract
This article adopts an ordered-probit estimation procedure to investigate the influence of competitive tendering on contract price and performance. Using a two-equation recursive system the findings of Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) turned out to be robust to the ordered-probit methodology which confirmed the strong negative effect of competitive tendering on contract price. The evidence also suggested that performance was either enhanced or remained the same in the presence of competition. Overall, the results of this investigation support the view that competitive tendering generates efficiency gains without adverse effects on quality of service .