How effective are public policy decissions?…The need for a general evaluation model

The successful inplementation of public policy decisions depends heavily upon knowing what information is required by the consumers and knowing the situational factors that determine whether or not the consumer will use the information. Implementation will only succeed if there is an attempt made to educate the consumer through methods other than “full disclosure.” The successful education of the consumer will only succeed if the policy decision makers are able to determine what the consumers need to know and how best to communicate this to them. The purpose of this paper is to present a general methodology for gathering information about groups of consumers or industries that will be affected by the policy decision. One of the major thrusts of the model is the emphasis placed on acquiring the information before the policy decision is made. The second major thrust is the proposal to “test market” policy decisions before they are actually made.     

Statistical Regularity and Free Will: L.A.J. Quetelet and P.A. Nekrasov

In the 19th century, causes of empirically observed stability of averages in settings relating to human behaviour were a topic of intense discussion in western Europe. This followed an extensive study of empirical stability by the founder of modern statistics (and of the International Statistical Institute) L.A.J. Quetelet, published in 1835, in what he called "Social Physics". The eminent mathematician of strong probabilistic and philosophical inclination and Russian Orthodox religious belief, P.A. Nekrasov, took up and modified Quetelet's Social Physics in 1902, with (social) independence seen as prime cause of statistical regularity. Our paper focuses on the role free will plays in the statistical writings of Quetelet and of Nekrasov. The work of the latter has remained little known in general, mainly for politico-ideological reasons.     

How it all began: the rise of listing requirements on the London, Berlin, Paris, and New York stock exchanges

The issue of accounting standards for foreign securities listed on a stock exchange arose gradually over the period 1825-1914 among the leading exchanges in the first global financial market—London, New York, Paris, and Berlin. Comparing their listing requirements on the eve of World War I, we find that the London and New York exchanges were most detailed, reflecting their common-law legal environments and their status as self-regulating organizations. The evolution of listing requirements in London and New York therefore influenced the development of accounting standards in those countries. By contrast, Paris and Berlin relied on validation of a security by political authorities. One result of these differences in legal and political environments was that American railroads issued the only securities to be listed on each of the four exchanges.     

The organisational learning system within small UK manufacturing firms

Organisational learning is increasingly being mentioned in the literature as a mechanism for assisting the market performance of small firms. There exists, however, limited empirical evidence on the learning systems utilised to manage the process. A survey was undertaken to acquire data on whether a relationship exists between learning style and the nature of learning systems used by small UK manufacturing firms. The results suggest that as firms move from single towards double-loop learning this is accompanied by the adoption of a more formalised learning system inside the organisation. The implications of these finding are discussed and proposals presented on the needs for further research.     

Contingent effects of firm and employee reputations on professional advice adoption

Applying resource-based theory and signaling theory, we argue that firm and employee reputations affect consumer adoption of advice offered by professional service providers, and these effects are contingent on contextual variables. Our study on brokerage reports in Singapore supports our arguments. We show that reliance on firm (employee) reputation when adopting advice is higher (lower) if the evaluation of an entity is an initial rather than a repeated one. Also, reliance on employee reputation increases with stronger recommendation or when the entity has a business relationship with the advice-giving firm. These findings have implications for advice-giving firms and policy makers.     

Dispelling some myths: Uncertain and multiple paths to globalization

Brink Lindsey. 2002. Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 336 pages; ISBN 0‐471‐44277‐1. Peter Hall & David Soskice (Eds.). 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 540 pages; ISBN 0‐199‐24775‐7.     

Accounting for organizational misconduct

Organizational misconduct (white collar, corporate and occupational crime, unethical behavior, rule violations, etc.) is an increasingly important social concern. This paper proposes that a necessary step toward preventing and treating such misconduct is the understanding of the explanations, called accounts, given by the actor. We argue that the theorizing and findings in the literature on accounts can be organized into a 2×2 matrix framework. The first dimension centers on whether or not the actor admits that some net harm is done by the act, and the second consists of whether or not the actor admits responsibility. When both are admitted (cell 1), the account is a concession, while denial of both constitutes a refusal (cell 4). Admitting responsibility but not harm equates to a justification (cell 2), and the opposite condition is an excuse (cell 3). Building on this matrix, we specify a typology of explanations within each cell which will highlight inter-cell differences. Finally, we explore the implications of this analysis for managers, regulators, and the public.Eugene Szwajkowski has taught in the Department of Management of the University of Illinois at Chicago since 1978, and as a visiting professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and at the University of Notre Dame. For the past fifteen years, Dr. Szwajkowski has been engaged in research on various aspects of illegal and unethical behavior within and on behalf of organizations. His research has investigated such practices as price-fixing and anti-competitive acquisitions, employee theft and sabotage, sex and race discrimination, and deceptive advertising.The author gratefully acknowledges the generous contributions of Drs. Laurie Larwood and Darold Barnum, and of two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Skewed Normal Variance-Mean Models for Asset Pricing and the Method of Moments

Financial returns (log-increments) data, Y _t , t = 1,2,…, are treated as a stationary process, with the common distribution at each time point being not necessarily symmetric.
We consider as possible models for the common distribution four instances of the General Normal Variance-Mean Model (GNVM), which is described by Y | V ∼ N ( a ( b + V ), c ²V + d² ) where V is a nonnegative random variable and a, b, c and d are constants. When V is Gamma distributed and d = 0, Y has the skewed Variance-Gamma distribution (VG). When V follows a Half Normal distribution and c = 0, Y has the well-known Skew Normal (SN) distribution. We also consider two cases where V is Exponentially distributed. Bounds for skewness and kurtosis in each case are found in terms of the moments of the V . These are useful in determining whether the Method of Moments for a given model is feasible. The problem of overdetermination of parameters via estimating equations is examined. 5 data sets of actual returns data, chosen because of their earlier occurrence in the literature, are analysed using each of the 4 models.