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Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13. 相似文献
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Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that
the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of
the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least
core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably
additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
Received: June 6, 1996; revised version: March 1, 1997 相似文献
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Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We
established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for
the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric
information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike
the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the
associated economy.
Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999 相似文献
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Ezra Davar 《Economic Systems Research》1993,5(1):3-10
Modern economies are characterized by a great variety of pricing rules. Therefore, the commodities' prices and the primay factors' prices are discriminated in reality. However, in practical input–output tables, as well as in theoy, the prices are uniform and relative. In this work, an input–output model is described with absolute and different prices for final uses commodities and production's primay factors (wages, profits, etc.). In this case, the economic relationships are based on the commodities' demand curves for all the categories of final uses, and the factors' supply curves for all production's branches. In this way, we can establish the linkage and the feedback between factors' prices and quantities, and final uses commodities' prices and quantities. This is obtained by a novel interpretation of input–output, which approximates reality better. 相似文献
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It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a finite set of players is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set of the game. We extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex simple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. We also show that a game with a countable (possibly finite) set of players which is inner continuous is convex iff the core of each of its subgames is a stable set.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71. 相似文献
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We study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information. 相似文献